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Payne v. Tennessee: The Demise of Booth
v. Maryland
INTRODUCTION
The last twenty years have seen a dramatic growth throughout
the United States in the area of victims' rights. California has
been a pioneer in this area, and was the first state to enact a statute
providing for state compensation for innocent victims of violent
crimes.2 In 1982, California amended its constitution to reflect an
increased concern with victims' rights3 By the beginning of 1991,
1. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28 (defining victim's rights to encompass the right to
restitution and the basic expectation that persons who commit felonious acts will be appropriately
punished). For a general description of the victims' rights movement see Carrington & Nicholson,
The Victim's Rights Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, I1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1 (1984).
Currently, there are an estimated 2,000 government and privately sponsored victim assistance
organizations at the state and local level. Id at 2. "Crime Victims Week" has also been proclaimed
by the President of the United States, as well as state governors and legislatures. Id Throughout this
Note the term "victim" may refer to the victim's family as well as the actual victim.
2. 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 1546, sec. 1, at 3703 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13960-13966),
repealed by 1973 Cal. Stat. ch. 1144, sec. 1, at 2348. California's current victim compensation
program is codified in Government Code sections 13959-13969.1 and Penal Code sections 1191.2,
1203.1(j), 1214, and 2085.5. See CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 13959-13969.1 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991)
(providing a comprehensive statutory scheme for compensating victims of crime); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1191.2 (West Supp. 1991) (requiring the probation officer to provide the victim information
concerning the victim's right to civil recovery); id § 1203.1(g) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring any
defendant convicted of sexual assault on a minor who is now eligible for parole to make restitution
for medical and psychological treatment); Id. § 1203.10j) (West Supp. i991) (requiring any defendant
convicted of assault with a deadly weapon on a victim 65 years of age or older to make restitution
for medical and psychological costs); ida § 1214 (West Supp. 1991) (describing enforcement
procedures for restitution awards to victims).
3. See CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28 (declaring the importance of protecting victim's right to
justice and restitution and declaring the necessity of enacting reforms in the procedural treatment of
accused persons and the disposition and sentencing of convicted persons to protect the victim's
rights). The people of California amended the state constitution by passing Proposition Eight, -The
Victim's Bill of Rights" on June 8, 1982.
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Congress and all fifty states had enacted comprehensive victims'
rights legislation.4
Advocates of the victims' rights movement seek to make the
criminal justice system more responsive to the needs of victims of
crime.' Many victims' rights activists argue that the principal
shortcomings of the American criminal justice system are the lack
of concern for crime victims as individuals, and the failure to treat
crime victims with dignity.6 Another focus of the victims' rights
movement is to encourage active involvement of victims in
criminal justice proceedings, especially in the sentencing phase of
the criminal process.7 In response to the need for victim
4. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1242
(enacting the Victim Witness Protection Act of 1982). The Victim Witness Protection Act of 1982
recognized various rights of victims, including notification of victims of proceedings in the
prosecution of the accused. l See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE'§§ 679, 679.01, 679.02 (West 1988)
(declaring the intent of the legislature that victims and witnesses of crime be treated "with dignity,
respect, courtesy, and sensitivity").
5. See Kiesel, Crime and Punishment: Victim Rights Movement Presses Courts, Legislatures,
70 A.B.A. J. 25, 25 (1984) (discussing the responsiveness of the criminal justice system to victims
of crime). See generally PaRswENr's TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS Or CRME, FINAL REPORT, 17-56
(1982) (hereinafter FINAL REPORT) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal) (proposing federal and state
action to address the interests of victims); Polito, The Rights of ictims in the Criminal Justice
System: Is Justice Blind to the Victims of Crime?, NEw ENO. J. ON CRiM. & Civ. CoNFINEME, 241,
241 (1990) (discussing the criminal justice system's response to victims' rights).
6. See Comment, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing
Decision, 36 UCLA. L REv. 199, 199. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 76-78 (1982)
(concluding that victim participation in the prosecution and sentencing will foster a victim's feeling
of dignity and justice); CAL. PENAL CODE § 679 (West 1988) (declaring the intent of the legislature
that victims and witnesses of crime are treated "with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity");
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 413-14 (1972) (Blackmun, I., dissenting) (discussing the failure
to personalize crime victims). Justice Blackmun stated that even though the various concurring
opinions in Furman acknowledged the heinous and atrocious character of the offenses, there was a
curious void in the concurring opinions of any discussion of the misery of the victims, their families
and the communities where the offenses took place. Id at 413-14 (1972) (Blackmun I., dissenting).
7. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 18 (proposing federal and state action to pass
legislation to require victim impact statements at sentencing); Comment, The Crime Victim and the
Criminal Justice System, 11 P:PPERDINE L Rev. 23, 28 (1984) (discussing the rationales for
enhanced victim involvement and reform). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West Supp. 1991)
(enacted by Proposition 8) (allowing victim participation in the sentencing phase of a criminal trial
by permitting a victim to express his or her views concerning the crime, the person responsible, and
the need for restitution). See also People v. Siripongs, 45 Cal. 3d 548, 585-86 n.12, 754 P.2d 1306
n.12, 247 Cal. Rptr. 729,751 n.12 (1988) (discussing Proposition 8 and the enactment of California
Penal Code § 1119.1). Many states have adopted a bifurcated trial in which there is a guilt phase and
a sentencing phase. See Bedau, Capital Punishment, 1 ENCYCOPEmDI OF CRIME AND JUSTIcE 133,
136 (S. Kadish ed. 1983) (generally discussing statutory and judicial sentencing).
1390
1992 / Payne v. Tennessee
involvement in the criminal process, legislation has been enacted
by the United States Congress and forty-eight states which provides
for the admission of victim impact evidence during the sentencing
phase of a criminal trial.'
In criminal trials, victim impact evidence is used by the
prosecution to promote stiffer penalties for the convicted
defendant.9 Direct evidence may be admitted in the form of
testimony by victims showing the impact of the crime on those
testifying.'0 Additionally, whether or not direct impact evidence
8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515, 3146(a), 3580,3597 (1988); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D);
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.022 (1990); AR]Z. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-253(4) (Supp. 1989); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 5-65-109 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-
11-102 (Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-91a (West 1985), 54-91c (West 1985 & Supp.
1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4331 (Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-103(a) (1990); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.143 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.1 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO
CODE § 19-5306(b) (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-3-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1982 &
Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-1-8 to 1-9 (Bums 1985 & Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 901.3(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4604(2) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.520 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 875(B) (West 1984); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1257 (Supp. 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c)(3) (1986);
MAss. GE . LAws ANN. ch. 279, § 4B, ch. 258B, § 3(h) (West Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS.
ANN. § 771.14 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611A.037-.038 (West Supp. 1990); MISs. CODE
ANN. §§ 99-19-151 to 19-159 (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 217.762 (Vernon 1990); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-112, 46-18-242 (1989); NEa. REv. STAT. § 29-2261 (1989); NEy. REV. STAT.
§ 176-145(3) (Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:4-a (1986); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-6(b)
(West 1982 & Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-24-5 (1990); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.30(3)
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 15A-825(9) (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2929.12, 2947.051 (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 982 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 137.530(2), 144.790(2) (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-9.3 (Purdon 1990); R.I. GEM. LAWS
§§ 12-28-3, 12-28-4, 12-28-4.1 (Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550 (Law. Co-op. 1989); S.D.
CODruED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27-1.1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-207 (8), -209(b) (1982 &
Supp. 1990); TEX. CRaI. PROC. CODE ANN. § 56.03 (Vernon 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-
20(l)(e) (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7006 (Supp. 1987), tit. 28, § 204(e) (1986); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-299.1 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.69.020(4), .030 (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE
§§ 61-11A-2, 61-11A-3, 61-11A-6 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 950.04(2m), .05(1)(dm) (West Supp.
1990); WYO. STAT. § 7-13-303(a)(iv)-(v) (all providing for the admission of victim impact evidence);
Comment, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36
UCLA L RE. 199, 200 n.12 (1988) (listing and describing victim impact statutes). See generally
infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing different legislation admitting victim impact
evidence).
9. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 808-09 (1989) (prosecution arguing
victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial).
10. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing various statutes allowing the admission
of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase of a criminal trial).
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is admitted, prosecutors may use the issue of victim impact in
closing argument at the sentencing phase of trial."
The admission of victim impact evidence in capital cases is
controversial due to the conflict of rights between the guilty
defendant and the defendant's innocent victims." The eighth
amefidment to the United States Constitution protects the defendant
charged with a capital crime by demanding the highest scrutiny of
the sentencing process. 3 The absence of any protection for
victims reflects an inequity in the criminal justice system since the
victim's interest in justice is at a pinnacle during the sentencing
stage of a capital case. 4 Arguably, when victims are not permitted
to participate in the defendant's trial, the victims continue to be
victimized.
Amidst this conflict between the interests of the defendant and
the victims, the Supreme Court of the United States, perhaps
triggered by the popular demand for more protection for victims of
crime, recently changed its course on the question of whether to
allow the admission of victim impact evidence in the sentencing
phase of a capital trial. 5 Contrary to its earlier decisions,16 the
Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee7 held that the eighth
amendment does not bar a. state from allowing a jury to consider
victim impact evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital
11. For convenience throughout this Note, all references to the admission of victim impact
evidence will include prosecutorial argument of this evidence.
12. See infra notes 87-299 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's opinion
in Payne v. Tennessee and Booth v. Maryland).
13. The eighth amendment states: "'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14. See Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System, 23 PEPPERDINE L. REv.
23, 41 (1984) (discussing the lack of any constitutional basis for victim's rights).
15. Compare Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) (holding the admission of
victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial constitutional) with Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1987) (holding the admission of victim impact evidence in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial unconstitutional). See notes 88-300 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's opinions in Payne and Booth).
16. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 (1987) (holding that the admission of victim
impact evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial is unconstitutional); South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 822-23 (1989) (holding prosecutorial argument of victim impact evidence in
the sentencing phase of a capital trial unconstitutional).
17. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
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case. 8 This Note will discuss the reversal by the Supreme Court
regarding the admissibility of victim impact evidence during the
sentencing phase of capital cases as presented in Payne.
Part I of this Note explores the legal background of the eighth
amendment in capital cases and how the eighth amendment relates
to victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital
trial.19 Part II discusses the majority, concurring and dissenting
opinions of the Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee. ° Finally,
Part IH assesses the potential legal ramifications of the Payne
decision with respect to both federal and California laws.2 '
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Determining the admissability of victim impact evidence in
death penalty cases can be difficult because the substantive2 and
procedural2 3 applications of the eighth amendment must be
considered in conjunction with the admissibility question. Thus, to
fully appreciate this question, it is first necessary to discuss the
relevant death penalty case law involving the eighth amendment
impact on capital sentencing. Once the applicable death penalty
cases have been developed, the focus will turn to the eighth
amendment's limitations, if any, on the admissibility of victim
impact evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
18. Id. at 2609.
19. See infra notes 22-125 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 126-299 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 300-427 and accompanying text.
22. For purposes of this Note, the term substantive application of the eighth amendment refers
to the actual infliction of the death penalty.
23. For purposes of this note the term procedural eighth amendment refers to the judicial
process by which the death penalty is imposed.
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A. Application of The Eighth Amendment to the Death Penalty
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.24 The United States
Supreme Court has struggled with the constitutionality of the death
penalty due to a variety of issues caused by the substantive and
procedural protection of the eighth amendment.' However, the
Supreme Court has held that the death penalty is not per se cruel
and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.26 Often the
constitutionality of a state's death penalty scheme is determined by
the amount of discretion a jury is allowed in deciding whether any
particular defendant should receive the death penalty. Thus, the
Supreme Court has held that a death penalty statute which gives
the jury unbridled discretion is unconstitutional.2" Under a similar
concept, statutes giving the jury no discretion at all have been held
unconstitutional by the Court.29 The three landmark cases of
Furman v. Georgia,3" Woodson v. North Carolina,3 and Gregg
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:"
The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 852-53 (1969) (discussing the original meaning of the
phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" and its first appearance in the English Bill of Rights of
1689).
25. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-70 (1976) (discussing the constitutionality
of the death sentence and the difficulty encountered by the Supreme Court in deciding the issue).
26. The United States Supreme Court has held that particular methods of executing a capital
sentence are allowable under the eighth amendment. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459, 464 (1974) (upholding execution by electric chair after first attempt failed due to
malfunction); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1890) (upholding death by electrocution);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1879) (upholding death by public shooting).
27. See Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238,256-57 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(discussing impermissible amount of jury discretion during the sentencing phase of a capital trial);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,301-05 (1976) (discussing the lack of any jury discretion
during the sentencing of a capital trial). See also infra notes 33-40, 60-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's opinion in Furman v. Georgia and Woodson v. North Carolina).
28. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). See infra notes 33-40, 60-70 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's opinion in Furman v. Georgia and Woodson v. North
Carolina).
29. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court's opinion in Woodson v. North Carolina).
30. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's opinion in Furman).
31. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's opinion in Woodson).
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v. Georgia32 involved application of the eighth amendment to the
death penalty. These cases have been the foundation of the
Supreme Court's decisions involving the constitutionality of the
death penalty.
In Furman, the defendant was sentenced to death for murder
under a Georgia statute which authorized the jury to choose one of
three punishments for murder: the death penalty, life imprisonment,
or imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary for between one to
twenty years.33 The statute did not provide any guidelines for the
jury in determining when each type of punishment would be
appropriate. 34 Deciding in favor of one sentence over the other
two punishments was purely a matter of juror discretion.35
In Furman, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a given sentence can be "cruel and unusual"
based only upon the procedure by which that punishment is
imposed.36 The Court answered in the affirmative, reasoning that
Georgia's death penalty statute created a substantial risk that the
punishment would be determined by the jury in an arbitrary or
capricious manner.37 According to the Court in Furman, the
unpredictability of the application of the death sentence was cruel
and unusual, and thus violative of the eighth amendment.38 The
32. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's opinion in Gregg).
33. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
34. Id at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
35. Id
36. See id at 253. Cf McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971) (rejecting the
argument that procedures imposing capital punishment violated the Due Process Clause).
37. Furman, at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); i
313-14 (White, J., concurring). The Furman Court issued five opinions in support of holding the
statute unconstitutional, and four dissenting opinions. Id 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); i at 257 (Brennan, L, concurring) i at 310 (Stewart, L, concurring); id at 313 (White,
J., concurring); id at 370 (Marshall, J., concurring); id at 375 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id at 414
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id at 464-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); id at 468 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
dissenting).
38. Id at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart
stated:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck down by
lightning is cruel and unusual.... Mhe petitioners are among a capriciously selected
handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed. The eighth and
fourteenth amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
1395
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Furman Court held that the jury must be given specified standards,
defined by the legislature, in order to impose the death penalty.39
The issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty itself was
addressed in Furman, but remained unresolved.' That issue was
finally answered in Gregg v. Georgia.41
In Gregg v. Georgia, the petitioner, Gregg, was sentenced to
death after being found guilty of armed robbery and murder.42
Gregg claimed that the death penalty was cruel and unusual in all
cases where it was imposed, regardless of the crime, the procedures
involved, or the character of the criminal.43 The Supreme Court
rejected Gregg's argument and held that the death penalty was not
per se cruel and unusual under the eighth amendment." In
reaching this conclusion the Gregg Court recognized that what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is not a static concept.45
In interpreting the eighth amendment, the Court drew meaning
from society's standards of decency.46 However, the Court
recognized that it must presume the validity of a punishment
selected by a democratically selected legislature.47 The Gregg
Court noted that while an examination of society's mores was
necessary, it was not the end of the inquiry.48 In addition to
comporting with the existing standards of decency, the Court stated
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.
Id at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
39. Id at 253-54 (Douglas, J., concurring).
40. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-69. In Furman, four justices, Burger, Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist, would have held that the death penalty was constitutional. Furman, 408 U.S.
at 375 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blacknun, I., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Two justices, Brennan and Marshall, would have
held that the death penalty is unconstitutional perse. Id at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314
(Marshall, J., concurring). Three justices, Douglas, Stewart and White, while agreeing that the statute
before them was unconstitutional, left open the issue as to the constitutionality of the death penalty.
Id at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id at 310 (White, J.,
concurring).
41. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
42. Id at 158.
43. Id at 168.
44. Id at 187.
45. Id. at 172-73".
46. Id at 173.
47. Id at 174.
48. Id at 173.
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that the sanction must not be "excessive.,, 49 The Gregg Court
asserted that the examination of excessive sanctions had two
components.5" First, there must not be an excessive infliction of
pain.5 Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime.52
In applying the first component, the Court looked to the theory
of punishment that justifies the sentence of death."3 The Court
concluded in Gregg that there was not enough evidence to show
that the legislature clearly erred in allowing the death penalty.54
The Court went on to analyze the second component,
proportionality, and held that the sentence of death for murder is
not disproportional.55 Therefore, the Court in Gregg held that the
death penalty was not per se unconstitutional under the eighth
amendment.5 6
The Court then turned to an analysis of whether the death
penalty was appropriate on the facts of Gregg under Furman v.
Georgia." In so doing, the Court refined the holding of Furman
by stating that the jury's discretion must be "directed and
limited."5 8 The Court referred to the standards set forth in the
Model Penal Code as illustrative of how a sentencing system could
be structured and meet Furman's constitutional concerns.59
In Woodson v. North Carolina' the Supreme Court addressed
the remaining question of whether a death penalty statute that
permitted the jury no discretion at all in sentencing was
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id.
52. Id
53. Id.
54. id 186-87.
55. Id at 187.
56. Id
57. Id at 188.
58. Id at 189. The Court in Gregg further asserted that standards for guiding a jury's
discretion are capable of being formulated by the state legislatures. Id at 192 (citing Report of the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, Cmd. 8932, 1 595).
59. Id. at 193. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 commentary at 71 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)
(asserting that standards to guide the jury can be developed).
60. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
1397
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
constitutional.6' The North Carolina sentencing statute in Woodson
contained an absolute mandate of the death penalty for all
defendants convicted of first degree murder.62 The statute was
challenged as violative of the eighth amendment on the theory that
the death penalty, under any circumstances, is unconstitutional
under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.63
The Woodson Court held that the mandatory death penalty
statute violated the eighth amendment for three reasons.' First,
the Court asserted that the statute did not comport with
contemporary standards regarding the imposition of the punishment
of death.65 The Court asserted this was due to the fact that the
North Carolina statute was a reaction to the rule handed down in
Funnan, that the jury not be given too much discretion, and
therefore, the statute did not reflect society's values.66 Second, the
Court recognized that the jury was given no discretion by the North
Carolina statute because that statute made the death penalty
mandatory upon a finding of guilt.67 The net effect of this lack of
discretion, the Court found, was that a jury which found a
defendant guilty of first degree murder, but felt the defendant was
not morally culpable enough to deserve the death sentence, would
simply find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder in order
61. Id. at 294-97.
62. Id. at 286.
63. See id. at 286-87 (describing the North Carolina murder statute as a mandatory death
penalty law).
64. Id. at 305.
65. Id. at 301.
66. fi, The Court noted that for 130 years prior to 1972 there was consistent rejection of a
mandatory death sentence. Id. at 298. However, the Court noted that since 1972 some states had
enacted a mandatory death sentence for fist degree murder and that this trend may have been an
example of society's reversal on it's view of the mandatory death sentence. X, at 298. The Court then
recognized that, in view of the persistent history of legislative rejection of mandatory death penalty
statutes beginning in 1838 and continuing for 130 years until Furman, it seemed evident that the
post-Furman enactments were due to the states trying to conform to the Constitution, rather than a
change in societal values. I. at 298. The Court stated that mandatory sentencing statutes enacted in
response to Furman have simply papered over the problem of unlimited jury discretion. Id at 302.
67. Id at 302.
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to avoid imposing the mandatory death sentence.68 The final
reason given by the Supreme Court for finding the statute
unconstitutional was that in mandating the death sentence, the
statute did not allow a jury to consider the defendant as a unique
human being.69 Thus, the North Carolina statute in Woodson
failed scrutiny under the eighth amendment for the same reason as
the Georgia statute in Furman: the application of the statutes led
to an arbitrary and capricious jury decision in imposing the death
sentence.7" This concern over juror imposition of the death
sentence based on caprice and emotion has led to a heated debate
over the constitutionality of victim impact evidence in the
sentencing stage of a capital trial.
B. The Eighth Amendment's Application to Victim Impact
Statements
It has been argued that victim impact evidence implicates the
eighth amendment because this information is irrelevant to
determining a defendant's moral blameworthiness and hence creates
a substantial risk of the death penalty being imposed in an arbitrary
or capricious manner.7' The term "victim impact evidence"
covers a wide variety of factual, opinion and documentary
68. Id. at 302-03. The Court relied on a North Carolina study commission which reaffirmed
this belief by reporting that juries "quite frequently" would not convict a defendant who was
otherwise guilty of first degree murder because of the enormity of the sentence automatically
imposed. See id, at 299-300 (quoting Report of the Special Commission For the Improvement of the
Administration ofJustice, North Carolina, Popular Government 13 (Jan. 1949)). Arguably, under the
North Carolina statute, the rights of the victim would be diminished instead of bolstered. The statute's
mandatory death penalty provision appeared to be tough on defendants and seemed to give at least
some solace to victims. However, because the statute deprives the jury of any discretion in sentencing
the defendant for first degree murder, some juries found the defendant guilty of only second degree
murder, and hence deprived the victim of a conviction of first degree murder. Id.
69. Id. at 304. The Court stated that the statute does not treat defendants convicted of capital
crimes as "uniquely individual human beings," but as members of a class on which the death penalty
is imposed. hla In order for the Woodson Court to rationalize the fact that in non-death penalty cases
a defendant is often not considered a "unique individual," the Court reasoned that the death penalty
is qualitatively different from an imposition of life imprisonment. Id at 305. The Court rested its
logic on the premise that the finality of death requires entirely different considerations. Id at 305.
70. Id at 303.
71. See generally Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504-07 (1987).
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evidence,72 and includes evidence from both the direct victim or
the victim's family members.73 Victim impact evidence is offered
in four basic types. The first type, which relates the circumstances
of the crime, includes the victim's statements regarding the crime
and the physical harm resulting to the victim.74 The second type
of victim impact evidence involves the personal characteristics of
the victim, including the victim's status in society, personality and
relationships with others. A third type of evidence includes the
emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family.76 Finally,
the fourth type of victim impact evidence encompasses a victim's
family members' testimony regarding characterizations and
opinions of the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate
sentence.77
Victim impact evidence is usually introduced in a victim impact
statement.7" As previously discussed, most jurisdictions have
enacted statutes allowing prosecutors to introduce victim impact
statements at the sentencing stage of the criminal proceeding.
79
Statutes that allow victim impact statements to be admitted in
criminal trials vary throughout the country. Some statutes require
that a victim impact statement be included in the pre-sentence
14,
72. See generally Comment, supra note 6, at 202-11 (1988) (discussing the variety of
information which may be provided by victim impact evidence).
73. Id.
74. Id
75. Id. (describing victim impact statutes that include allow the admission of evidence relating
to the personal characteristics of the victim and his or her personal relationships). See Payne v.
Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2596, 2611 n.2 (discussing the types of victim impact evidence that were
presented in Payne). See, e.g., MD. ANN. CoDE art. 41, § 4-609(c)(3)(i) (1986) (allowing a victim
impact statement to "identify the victim").
76. Comment, supra note 6, at 201-10 (1988) (describing the level of victim harm that is
included in victim impact statements). See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2 (discussing the types of
victim impact evidence that were presented in Payne). See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-
609(c)(3)(v) (1986) (allowing a victim impact statement to identify any requests for psychological
services initiated by the victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense).
77. Comment,supra note 6, at 207-10 (1988). See Payne, III S. Ct. at 2611 n.2 (discussing
the types of victim impact evidence that were presented in Payne).
78. See generally Comment, note 6, (discussing victim impact statements).
79. See supra note 8 (listing the statutes allowing admission of victim impact statements
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial).
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report for all felonies, ° while others only allow admission of
victim impact evidence if a victim impact statement is required by
the court.8" In other jurisdictions, the victim is allowed to testify
orally regarding the contents of the victim impact statement in front
of the defendant before a sentence is entered, 2 or the victim may
speak freely at the sentencing proceedings. 3 A few statutes allow
the victim to submit only a personally drafted statement,84 while
other statutes require the probation officer to draft a statement
which includes an objective assessment of the degree of harm
caused by the crime. Victim impact statements in the sentencing
phase of a capital trial have been challenged due to their potential
for inflaming the jury, thus creating a risk of an arbitrary or
capricious decision in violation of the eighth amendment.8 6 The
first United States Supreme Court case to address the
constitutionality of the admission of victim impact statements
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial was Booth v.
Maryland.87
In Booth v. Maryland, the defendant robbed and murdered an
elderly couple, Irvin and Rose Bronstein."8 A victim impact
statement was prepared pursuant to a Maryland statute that required
a victim impact statement to be admitted in the pre-sentence report
80. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.022 (1988) (requiring the probation officer to include the
need for restitution and financial, emotional and medical effects of the offense in the pre-sentence
report of each felony offender).
81. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 901.3 (West 1988) (requiring the courts to order a pre-
sentence investigation before victim impact statement can be admitted).
82. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2 (1985) (allowing a victim to make an impact
statement in the presence of the defendant before a sentence is determined).
83. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West Supp. 1991) (allowing victim participation
in the sentencing phase of a criminal trial).
84. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2261 (1985) (requiring the admission of any written
statements submitted to the county attorney or the probation officer by a victim).
85. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.051 (Baldwin 1987) (requiring the probation
officer or a victim assistance program operated by the state to prepare a victim impact statement).
86. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's opinion in Furman
and the unconstitutionality of a statute that creates a risk of a decision to impose the death sentence
based on arbitrariness or caprice by giving the jury too much discretion).
87. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
88. Id. at 497.
1401
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 23
of all felony cases. 9 The victim impact statute involved in Booth
required the parole officer to prepare the statement, which was
based on interviews with the Bronstein's family, including their
son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter.' Many of the
family's comments focused on the victims' outstanding personal
qualities and the deep sense of loss resulting from the Bronsteins'
murder.91 Other victim impact evidence described the emotional
problems the family had sustained because of the murders.
92
For example, the son stated that he suffered from insomnia and
depression and that he was afraid for the first time in his life.93
The son also testified that he believed that his parents were
"butchered like animals." 94 Similarly, the daughter complained
of sleeplessness and indicated that since the murder she had
become withdrawn and distrustful.95 The daughter stated that she
could not watch scary movies or look at kitchen knives without
being reminded of the murders. 96 The daughter also testified that
she could not forgive the defendant and, in her opinion, the
defendant could "never be rehabilitated." 97  Next, the
granddaughter described how the wedding of a close family
member had been ruined by the defendant's act and stated that
instead of proceeding on a honeymoon the bride had attended the
funeral.98  The victim impact statement introduced at the
sentencing phase also included the fact that the granddaughter had
89. Id at 498-99. The Maryland statute required specifically that the report contain the identity
of the victim of the offense, an itemization of any economic loss, to identify any physical injury
suffered by the victim, identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim, and
contain any other information that the court requires. Id at 498-99.
90. Id at 499.
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id at 499-500.
94. Id at 500.
95. Id
96. Id.
97. Id
98. id
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received counseling, but had stopped because she felt that no one
could help her."
A jury found Booth guilty of two counts of first degree murder,
two counts of robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery and
sentenced him to death."° On automatic appeal, the Maryland
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence.1
Booth alleged that the admission of the victim impact statement
violated the eighth amendment. 2 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the eighth amendment
prohibits the admission of victim impact evidence during the
sentencing phase of a capital trial."0 3
The Court in Booth stated that a jury must take into
consideration the defendant's record, characteristics, and the
circumstances of the crime, in order to arrive at an individual
determination of whether the defendant should receive the death
sentence. 4 The Court reiterated the Woodson rule that the jury
is required to focus on the defendant as a uniquely individual
human being. 5 In addition, the Court stated that only evidence
related to blameworthiness was relevant to the capital sentencing
decision. 106
99. Id. The Division of Parole and Probation official who conducted the interviews concluded
the victim impact statement by stating:
It became increasingly apparent to the writer as she talked to the family members that the
murder of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein is still a shocking, painful, and devastating memory to
them that it permeates every aspect of their daily lives. It is doubtful that they will ever
be able to fully recover from this tragedy and not be haunted by the memory of the brutal
manner in which their loved ones were murdered and taken from them.
Il
100. Id. at 498.
101. See Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
102. Booth, 482 U.S. at 500-01.
103. ld. at 501-02.
104. Id. at 502.
105. I. at 504. The Woodson Court held that when a defendant is being sentenced with the
possibility of receiving the death penalty, the jury must be presented with relevant facets of his
character such that they can view the defendant as a "'uniquely individual human being." Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 304.
106. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504. The Booth Court found that a statute that requires the
consideration of factors other than those having a bearing on blameworthiness must be scrutinized
to ensure that the evidence has some bearing on the defendant's personal responsibility and moral
guilt. Id.
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The Court in Booth determined that the victim impact
statements at issue contained two types of information.107 The
Court found that the first category of victim impact evidence, the
victim characteristics and emotional impact to the family, was
completely unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular
defendant and thus irrelevant.108 The Court justified this position
on the basis that the personal characteristics of the victim and the
emotional impact on the family are, in most cases, unintended or
unknown by the killer and thus do not factor into a defendant's
moral blameworthiness."°9
The Booth Court also recognized that it would be difficult, if
not impossible, for the defendant to rebut the victim impact
evidence."' The Court questioned how a defendant would prove
that the victim's family was exaggerating their depression,
emotional pain or insomnia."' The Court in Booth recognized
that the defendant might be able to rebut victim impact evidence
by introducing evidence about the victim's character."' The
Court hypothesized that such a rebuttal would include evidence that
the victim was unpopular, was of bad moral character, or that the
victim was ostracized by his or her family." 3 However, the Booth
Court argued that in attempting to rebut such evidence, the trial
would be transformed into a mini-trial on the victim's personal
characteristics."' The Court believed that this result was
unacceptable because it would distract the jury from its duty of
107. Id
108. Id.
109. Id at 504-05. However, the Court stated that if the victim impact evidence related to the
circumstances of the crime it would be relevant to the moral culpability of the defendant. Id at 507
n.10. Further, the Court noted that if a defendant did take into consideration the personal
characteristics of the victim, and the impact the crime would have on the family, this would reflect
on the defendant's moral blameworthiness and, thus, be relevant. AL at 505. However, the Court
noted that even though this evidence may be relevant, victim impact evidence is not admissible
because of the impermissible risk that a capital sentencing decision will be made in an arbitrary
manner due to the nature of the information contained in the victim impact statement. Id at 505.
110. Id at 507. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (holding that due process
requires a defendant be given a chance to rebut a pre-sentence report).
111. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506.
112. Id
113. Id at 506-07.
114. Id at 507.
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determining whether the death penalty was warranted." 5
Therefore, the Court in Booth held that victim impact evidence
involving the personal characteristics of the victim and emotional
impact on the family was not admissible in the sentencing phase of
a capital trial." 6 According to the Booth Court, the introduction
of these types of evidence violated the eighth amendment because
it created an unjustified risk of a wholly arbitrary and capricious
application of the death sentence.117
The Booth Court also found that the second category of
information, the family members' opinion of the crime and
characterization of the defendant, was likewise irrelevant to
determination of the blameworthiness of a defendant. "' The
Court stated that the only purpose for the second category of
information was to inflame the jury." 9 Thus, the Supreme Court
held in Booth that the admission of both types of victim impact
evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial violated the
eighth amendment.'
Two years after Booth v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
extended its holding in Booth to exclude the use of victim impact
evidence in prosecutorial argument in South Carolina v.
Gathers.' In Gathers, the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to death for the slaying of a mentally
115. Id. Another consideration that weighed heavily in the Court's analysis was the fact that
the jury's decision to give the death penalty might turn on irrelevant and inappropriate considerations
such as the articulateness of the victim's family or the amount of esteem that a victim enjoyed in the
community. I& at 505.
116. 1L at 507.
117. Id at 509. However, the Court did state that admission of victim impact evidence would
not be irrelevant in all contexts. Id at 507 n.10. The Court stated that this type of information may
be admissible when it directly relates to the circumstances of the crime. Id. The Court asserted that
victim impact evidence may be relevant in a non-capital trial, Id Also, the victim's personal
characteristics may be relevant to rebut an argument offered by the defendant during the guilt phase
of the trial. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 404(a)(2) (providing that the prosecution may show peaceable
nature of victim to rebut charge that victim was the aggressor).
118. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508.
119. Id The Court referred to the son's statement that his parent's were "butchered like
animals" and that he "doesn't think anyone should be able to get away with it" to show that the
only effect of admitting these statements was to incite the jury. Id
120. Id. at 509.
121. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
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handicapped person." During the sentencing phase of the trial,
the prosecutor read a prayer card that was found next to the
victim's body.123 Gathers argued that this information was
irrelevant in light of Booth and therefore should be
inadmissible. 24 The Supreme Court agreed, and held that the
testimony was irrelevant to the determination of the sentence and
therefore was unconstitutional.'25 Four years after Booth, and two
years after Gathers, the Supreme Court was again faced with the
question of whether victim impact evidence and prosecutorial
argument utilizing victim impact evidence was admissible in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial. Those issues were addressed in
Payne v. Tennessee.
2 6
If. THE CASE
A. The Factual and Procedural History
The victims in Payne v. Tennessee were twenty-eight-year-old
Charisse Christopher, her two-year-old daughter Lacie, and her
three-year-old son Nicholas. 27 The family lived together in an
apartment in Millington, Tennessee, across the hall from the
defendant's girlfriend.121 On the morning of the murders, the
defendant, Payne, spent his time injecting cocaine and drinking
beer. 29 Payne then drove around town with a friend before he
returned to the Christophers' apartment complex. 30 Payne entered
the Christophers' apartment and made sexual advances toward
Charisse.13 1 Charisse resisted and Payne became violent. 132 A
122. Id. at 807-08.
123. Id at 808.
124. Id.
125. Id at 822-23.
126. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
127. IX. at 2601.
128. Id
129. Id
130. Id
131. Id
132. Id.
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neighbor heard Charisse scream "get out.' ' 133 The neighbor
called the police after hearing a second scream. 134
When police officers arrived at the scene, they encountered
Payne leaving the complex appearing extremely nervous and
anxious.' When a police officer questioned Payne, Payne struck
the officer and fled.'36 Inside the apartment the police discovered
the bodies of Charisse and her children lying on the kitchen
floor. 137 Blood covered the walls and floor throughout the
apartment. 138 Charisse was found dead, on her back with her legs
fully extended. 139 She had sustained forty-two direct knife
wounds and forty-two defensive wounds on her arms and
hands. 4 The wounds, were caused by forty-one' 4' separate
thrusts with a butcher knife.142 The autopsy determined that
although none of the eighty-four wounds inflicted by Payne were
individually fatal, death probably occurred as a result of bleeding
from all the wounds.
43
Charisse's daughter's body was on the kitchen floor near her
mother, with the murder weapon lying at her feet.' 44 She had
suffered stab wounds to the chest, abdomen, back and head.
45
Payne's baseball cap was snapped around her arm near her elbow
and there were three cans of malt liquor bearing Payne's
fingerprints on a table near Charisse's daughter's body.
146
Nicholas, Charisse's son, survived the attack, despite several
133. Ic
134. IdX
135. Ia&
136. Id at 2601-02.
137. Id. at 2602.
138. Ra.
139. Id
140. Id
141. A doctor testified that the number of thrusts was only 41 because one went through
Charisse's body and thrusts that go through the body are counted as two wounds. State v. Payne, 791
S.W.2d 10 (1990), affd sub nom. Payne v. Tennessee, III S. CL 2597 (1991).
142. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2602.
143. Id
144. Id
145. Id
146. Id
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wounds inflicted by a butcher knife that completely penetrated his
body from front to back. 147 In spite of the assault, Nicholas was
awake when he was found by the police. 4 1
Payne was later found hiding in the attic of a former
girlfriend's house.'49 As Payne descended the stairs, he stated to
the police officers that he had not killed a woman.'5 Payne's
clothes and body were stained with blood that was later determined
to match the blood of the victims. 5' Payne was arrested, and
convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of
assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree.1 52
Payne presented the testimony of his parents, a friend, and Dr.
Huston, a clinical psychologist who specialized in criminal
evaluations. 153 Payne's parents testified that Payne had no
criminal record and had never been arrested.1 54 Payne's parents
also stated that Payne had no history of drug abuse, had worked
with his father as a painter, was good with children, and was a
good son.' 55
Payne's friend, Bobbie Thomas, testified that she had met
Payne at church and that Payne had helped when Thomas was
being abused by her husband. 56 Thomas stated that Payne was
a very caring person, and that Payne had devoted much time and
attention to her three children.1 57 In addition, Thomas stated that
Payne had treated her children in the same loving manner he would
have treated his own children. '58 Thomas also asserted that Payne
did not drink, nor did he use drugs, and that she believed that it
147. Id.
148. Id
149. I
150. 1d
151. Id
152. Id
153. Id In a capital trial a defendant is allowed to bring forward any relevant mitigating
evidence. Id at 2608-09.
154. Id at 2602-03.
155. Id at 2603.
156. Id at 2602.
157. Id
158. Id
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was generally inconsistent with Payne's character to have
committed these crimes. 159
Dr. Huston testified that Payne was mentally handicapped due
to his low score on an IQ test.' 60 Dr. Huston also testified that
Payne was neither psychotic nor schizophrenic.' 6 Dr. Houston
gave his opinion that Payne was the most polite prisoner he had
ever met.'62
In order to show the harm caused by the defendant Payne, the
State presented victim impact evidence from Charisse's
mother. 163 When Charisse's mother was asked how her grandson,
Nicholas, had been affected by the murders of his mother and sister
she responded:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't
come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many
times during the week and asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my
Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says I'm worried about my Lacie. 
164
In addition to the evidence of the effect of the crime upon
Nicholas, the prosecutor, in his closing arguments, commented on
the continuing effects of Nicholas' experience. 65 The prosecutor
stated that Nicholas was awake with his eyes open and understood
the paramedics when they found him, because Nicholas was able
to respond to directions.'66 The prosecutor also pointed out that
as Nicholas was being carried to the ambulance, he was physically
able to apply pressure with his hands to his own abdomen so that
his intestines would not protrude from his body. 67 Further, the
prosecutor argued that this evidence supported the conclusion that
Nicholas knew what had happened to his mother and sister. 6
159. Md.
160. Id.
161. Id at 2608-09.
162. Id at 2602.
163. Id at 2603.
164. Id
165. Id
166. Id.
167. Id
168. Id
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Stating that there was nothing that could be done to ease the pain
of the families involved, the prosecutor argued:
There is nothing that can be done for Charisse and Lacie Jo. But there
is something you can do for Nicholas. Somewhere down the road
Nicholas is going to grow up, hopefully. He is going to know what
happened to his baby sister and his mother. He is going to want to
know what type of justice was done. He is going to want to know what
happened. With your verdict you will provide the answer.
You saw the video tape this morning. You saw what Nicholas
Christopher will carry in his mind forever. When you talk about cruel,
when you talk about atrocious, and when you talk about heinous, that
picture will always come into your mind, probably throughout the rest
of your lives.
Nicholas's mother will never be there to kiss him good night. No
one will know about Lacie Jo. Her life was taken away at two years
old.
169
The prosecutor further commented about the mitigating
evidence that Payne had presented to the jury:
The Petitioner wants you to think about a good reputation, people who
love the defendant and things about him. He doesn't want you to think
about the people who love Charisse Christopher, her mother, and daddy
who loved her. The people who loved little Lacie Jo, the grandparents
who are still here. The brother who mourns for her every single day and
wants to know where his best little playmate is. He doesn't have
anybody to watch cartoons with him, a little one. These are the things
that go into why it is especially cruel, heinous, and atrocious, the
burden that child will carry forever.
170
Over Payne's objection, these statements were admitted during
the sentencing phase. 7' Payne contended that the admission of
victim impact evidence violated his eighth amendment rights as
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id.
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provided by the Booth and Gathers decisions. 72 Nevertheless, the
jury sentenced Payne to death.'73
Defendant Payne appealed the imposition of the death sentence
to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.174 Specifically, Payne argued
that the admission of the testimony of the Charisse's mother, and
allowing the prosecutor's closing arguments, constituted prejudicial
violations of his fights under the eighth amendment as interpreted
in Booth v. Maryland.'75 The Tennessee court rejected Payne's
argument, characterizing the admission of the grandmother's
testimony as a harmless error because it was technically irrelevant
and did not create an unacceptable risk of an arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty.176 The Tennessee court, therefore, held that
the testimony was constitutional under both Furman v. Georgia and
Booth v. Maryland.7 7 In responding to Payne's argument that
Gathers, decided after Payne's conviction, barred the prosecutor's
statements to the jury, the court stated that the prosecutor's
statements were not irrelevant as Payne had argued.' 8 In direct
contradiction to the holding in Gathers, the Tennessee court stated
"[it] is an affront to the civilized members of the human race to
say that at sentencing in a capital case, a parade of witnesses may
praise the background, character and good deeds of Defendant [sic]
172. lit at 2604.
173. d at 2601.
174. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10(1990),affidsubnom. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991).
175. Payne, 111 S. CL at 2604.
176. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d at 19. The Supreme Court of Tennessee did not try and mask
its disfavor of the rule handed down in Booth and extended in Gathers. The Court declared that the
Supreme Court of the United States has "read...a so-called religious tract, couched in sporting
parlance, seeking God's help in playing the game of life as a good sport should" into its
condemnation of victim impact evidence. Id at 18.
177. Id at 20. The Supreme Court of Tennessee characterized the testimony of Nicholas'
grandmother as a factual statement. l at 18. The court reasoned this statement was qualitatively
different from the victim impact statement in Booth. Id at 20. The court stated that the victim impact
evidence in Booth was much more extensive and inflammatory than Nicholas' grandmother's
testimony during Payne's trial. Id The Tennessee court reasoned that, while technically irrelevant,
the grandmother's statement did not create an unacceptable risk of a arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty. L Finally, the court indicated that the prosecutor's act of picking up the murder weapon and
stabbing a diagram of Nicholas Christopher's body, although improper, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id
178. Id at 19.
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(as was done in this case), without limitation as to relevancy, but
nothing may be said that bears upon the character of, or the harm
imposed, upon the victims."' 79 Due to of the important issues
involved in Payne v. Tennessee,' the Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari to reconsider its holdings in Booth
v. Maryland' and South Carolina v. Gathers.'82
B. The Majority Opinion
1. Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,'83 the
Supreme Court overturned Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina
v. Gathers by holding that the eighth amendment erects no per se
bar to the admission of victim impact evidence. 84 In reaching its
result, the Payne majority noted that the Booth opinion was based
upon two premises.' The majority pointed out that the initial
premise of Booth was that evidence of the victim's characteristics
and of the harm done to the victim's family is not probative of the
defendant's blameworthiness." 6 Next, the Court in Booth had
asserted that only evidence related to blameworthiness is relevant
to the capital sentencing decision. 7
179. 1d.
180. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
181. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
182. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). See Payne, II S. CL at 2601.
183. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy and Souter. Payne, III S. Ct. at 2601. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in
which Justices White and Kennedy joined. Id. at 2611-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia
filed a concurring opinion in which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined in part II. 1d at 2613-14
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined.
Id at 2614-19 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Marshall filled a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Blackmun. Id at 2619-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion joined
by Justice Blackmun. Id at 2625-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id at 2609. See infra notes 394-428 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of
stare decisis).
185. Payne, 111 S. CL at 2605.
186. Id See infra notes 39-56 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of victim
impact evidence to a determination of moral culpability).
187. Payne, I I 1 S. Ct. at 2605.
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The majority in Payne rejected the premise that victim impact
evidence is not probative of a defendant's blameworthiness, and
stated that the harm done as a result of a crime has always been an
important consideration in criminal law, in both the determination
of the elements of an offense and sentencing.18 The majority
argued that one fundamental principle of criminal sentencing is that
the punishment should be made to fit, the crime and that a true
measure of a crime is the harm done to society.18 9 Thus, the
Payne majority recognized that two defendants may be considered
guilty of different crimes solely based upon the actual harm
caused. ,9
The majority asserted that the amount of harm caused by a
defendant is significant in two respects.19 First, harm is a
prerequisite to criminal sanction."9 Without harm, there is
generally no reason to punish. 93 Second, the majority would
measure the seriousness of the crime to determine the severity of
sentence that will be meted out. 94 The majority further asserted
that, as long as relevant evidence does not prejudice a defendant,
it is desirable that the jury have as much information as possible
without restrictions. 195 Based on these considerations, the
majority concluded that the harm caused by a defendant's crime is
188. Id
189. Id (quoting the 18th century Italian criminologist CESARE BECCARIA, in J. FARRER,
CRamEs AND PuNisH ENTS, 199 (London, 1880)). Two thousand years ago Cicero stated, "'Noxiae
poena par esto'" (Let the punishment match the offense). CIcERo, DE LEGiBUS, 111, 20 (C. W. Keys
Trans. 1928). See H. PACKER, LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 43-44 (1968) (discussing the
death penalty as a reflection of society's moral outrage).
190. Payne, 111 S. CL at 2606. For example, the majority cites Justice Scalia's example of a
bank robber who points a gun at a guard, with the intent to kill, and pulls the trigger. Id at 2605
(citing Booth, 482 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). If the bank robber kills the guard he can be
put to death. let at 2605. If the gun somehow misf rs he cannot Id, In both cases his moral guilt
is identical, but his responsibility in the former is greater. Id The majority additionally pointed out
that wherever judges have had discretion to impose a sentence, the consideration of the harm has to
be an important factor in the exercise of that discretion. Id at 2602.
191. Id at 2606 (quoting S. WHEELER, K. MANN, & A. SARAT, SITING IN JUDGMENT. THE
SENTENCaNO Op WHn'E-CoLLAR CRmNAS 56 (1988)).
192. Id
193. Id.
194. Id
195. Id at 2606 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04).
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relevant. 96 The majority in Payne further asserted that victim
impact evidence is simply one method of informing the jury about
the specific harm caused by the defendant's crime. 9 7
The Payne majority stated that a misreading of precedent by the
Booth Court had resulted in an unfair tipping of the scales of
justice in a capital trial in favor of the defendant.'98 The majority
reiterated that a state is required by the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution to admit all relevant mitigating evidence,
in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, that the defendant offers
in support of a sentence less than death. 99 Thus, the Payne
majority, agreeing with Booth on this point, required that a
defendant in a capital trial be treated as a unique human being.200
However, the majority in Payne asserted that the Court had never
held, nor even suggested, in any case before Booth, that the
defendant was to receive this individual consideration as a human
being apart from consideration of the crime committed.2"' The
Payne majority asserted that the language quoted in Booth to the
effect that the capital murder defendant be treated as a uniquely
individual human being was intended to describe a class of
evidence that must be admitted.202 The statement was not
intended to describe a class of evidence that was not
admissible.203 The Payne majority concluded that the effect of the
misreading of precedent in Booth is that a defendant can bring
forward virtually any mitigating evidence, while the state is barred
from either offering a glimpse of the life which a defendant chose
to extinguish, or demonstrating the loss to the victim's family and
to society which has resulted from the homicide committed by the
196. Id at 2608.
197. Id at 2608.
198. Id at 2607.
199. Id at 2606. See infra notes 383-394 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications
of the admission of any mitigating evidence).
200. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606.
201. Id at 2607.
202. Id at 2606-07.
203. Id at 2607. The Majority pointed out that any doubt as to this premise is dispelled when
considering language from Gregg which said that a wide range of evidence may be considered. Id
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defendant." As a result, the majority concluded that the
inadmissability of victim impact evidence created an inequity,
because the absence of victim impact evidence deprived the state
of the full moral force of its case which is necessary in a capital
case.
20 5
The Payne majority continued by noting that the various
concerns of the Court in Booth did not justify the blanket
prohibition of victim impact evidence.2°6 The Court in Booth had
concluded that victim impact evidence must be excluded because
of the difficulty a defendant would encounter in trying to rebut
victim impact evidence, and the possibility of shifting the focus of
the jury from the defendant to a trial of the victim's character. 7
The majority in Payne argued that in many cases the evidence
relating to the victim is already before the jury in the guilt
phase.28 As to any additional evidence, the majority determined
that the mere fact that it would not be prudent for the defense to
rebut the evidence, does not make the situation different from other
cases in which the defendant is faced with the same dilemma.0 9
204. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607. Implicit in this argument is the consideration that the people
have a right to a balanced proceeding. As Justice Cardozo stated for the Court in Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934): "But justice, though due the accused, is due to the accuser
also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep
the balance true." The Court has repeatedly upheld the peoples* right to due process. See, e.g.,
United States v. Nixon 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (holding that the very integrity of the judicial
system depends upon full access to evidence by either side); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196-
97 (1953), overruled on other grounds in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1968) (reiterating that
the People of the State are entitled to due process); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288-89 (1947)
(holding that a defendant is entitled to a neutral jury as opposed to a friendly jury, and that society
has a right to a fair trial); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
205. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606-07.
206. Id See infra notes 388-420 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's opinion in
Booth).
207. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506-07 (1987)).
208. Id. at 2607.
209. Id. The majority asserted that the defendant's position is similar to that of the prosecutor's.
Id The prosecutor is also faced with the difficulty of a rebuttal when the defendant calls a witness
that gives mitigating evidence. Id. For example, when a defendant calls his mother to be a witness
the prosecution is faced with trying to rebut her testimony about her son. Id. The state in Booth was
faced with this dilemma and decided not to rebut the mitigating evidence admitted. Booth, 482 U.S.
at 518 (White, J., dissenting). See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,213 (1971) (stating that the
constitution does not shield the defendant from making difficult choices); Booth, 482 U.S. at 519
(White, J., dissenting) (stating that the possibility that the jury would be distracted by rebuttal
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The Payne majority rejected another concern, evident in the Booth
decision, that the admission of victim impact evidence would
permit a jury to hand down a death sentence based upon the social
status of the victim.21 The majority dismissed this concern by
asserting that victim impact evidence is not offered to encourage
comparative judgments.2 ' The majority found that victim impact
evidence is designed to show each victim's uniqueness as an
individual human being, regardless of what the jury might think the
loss to the community resulting from the victim's death might
be.212
Finally, the Payne majority found that victim impact evidence
is encompassed within the state's power to create new procedures
to meet felt needs. 2 3  The majority stated that the primary
responsibility for defining crimes, and enacting the corresponding
punishments, belongs to the states.2"' The majority asserted that
the eighth amendment does impose special limitations on this
power 5.2 " However, within the eighth amendment the states are
free, in capital cases as well as others, to devise new procedures as
the need arises. 6 The majority in Payne held that victim impact
evidence is simply another way to inform the sentencing authority
about the specific harm that the' defendant's crime has caused.217
Thus, the majority stated that the Booth decision was incorrect
when it determined that victim impact evidence led to the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty. 28 The Payne majority asserted
evidence is purely hypothetical, since in Booth the State introduced no such evidence). The rules of
evidence generally anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted to the fact
finder, the fact finder is to determine its weight, after cross examination and contrary evidence has
been admitted. Payne, 11 S. Ct. at 2607 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983)).
210. Payne, I11 S. Ct. at 2607.
211. Id.
212. Id. The Court pointed to the facts of Gathers as a good example. South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 806-07 (1989). The victim in Gathers was an out of work, mentally
handicapped individual and yet the death penalty was imposed. Id. at 806-07.
213. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608.
214. I1& at 2607.
215. 1& at 2608.
216. Id.
217. Id The majority noted that forms of victim impact evidence have long been considered
by the sentencing authority. Id
218. Id.
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that there is a mechanism for relief in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment if victim impact evidence is so prejudicial
that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.2" 9 Therefore, the
majority reasoned that the concern of the Court in Booth, that
unduly prejudicial evidence would be admitted, was
unfounded.22
In applying these arguments to the facts of the Payne case, the
majority reasoned that Payne was a prime example of the
unfairness created by the Booth decision.21 The defendant Payne
had been allowed to introduce mitigating evidence that Payne was
affectionate, caring, kind, good to children and a good man who
was not an abuser of drugs or alcohol. ' Additional evidence was
given that Payne was an extremely polite prisoner and that he
suffered from a low IQ."23
In contrast, the majority pointed out that the only evidence of
the impact of Payne's crime admitted was the statement of
Nicholas' grandmother that Nicholas missed his baby sister and his
mother.224 The majority found that there was nothing unfair about
admitting evidence that depicted some of the harm caused by
Payne's crimes.' The majority agreed with the Supreme Court
of Tennessee that it would be unfair on the facts of this case to
disallow the victim impact statements."
The Payne majority continued by stating that under Gathers,
the defendant's attorney is allowed the broadest latitude to argue
mitigating evidence reflecting the defendant's personality.227 The
majority asserted that since Payne's attorney argued this evidence,
it would be unfair to not allow the prosecution to admit
aggravating victim impact evidence. 8 The majority then held
219. Id.
220. 1&.
221. Id.
222. Id& at 2602-03.
223. I1& at 2608-09.
224. Id. at 2609.
225. I1&
226. Md. at 2608-09.
227. Id at 2609.
228. Id.
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that the arguments for the admission of victim impact evidence
outlined above applied with equal force to prosecutorial argument
of that evidence, and therefore the prosecutorial argument of victim
impact evidence is also constitutional under the eighth
amendment.229
2. Rejection of Stare Decisis
In a later portion of the opinion, the majority rejected Payne's
arguments that despite the various shortcomings of Booth and
Gathers, the Court should adhere to the doctrine of stare
decisis.23 ° The majority recognized that stare decisis is the
preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable,
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process."' The majority also noted that
often it is more important to have the rule of law settled than to
have it settled correctly. 2 Nevertheless, the majority stated that
it was not bound to uphold decisions that are unworkable or are
badly reasoned. 233 The majority noted that stare decisis is not a
mechanical device that should be applied as a formula to the latest
decision.3 While the majority asserted that consideration of
stare decisis is most important in cases involving property and
contract rights, the majority argued that the opposite is true in cases
involving procedural and evidentiary rules. 3
The majority stated that an important factor for overruling
Booth and Gathers was the fact that those cases were decided by
five to four split decisions, over spirited dissents challenging the
229. Id
230. Id at 2609.
231. Id (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986)).
232. Id (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)).
233. Id [mhis Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent." Id. (quoting Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)).
234. Id. at 2609-10.
235. Id at 2610. The Court pointed out that the application of stare decisis -[is] at [its] acme
in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved." Id
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basic underpinnings of those decisions.236 In addition, the
majority argued that Booth and Gathers have not been applied
consistently by the lower courts." In reconsidering Booth and
Gathers, the Payne majority found that those cases were wrongly
decided and thus overruled.238
C. Concurring opinions of Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Souter
Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Souter concurred with the
majority in the ultimate holding that the eighth amendment does
not pose a per se bar to victim impact evidence.239 Justice
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion to reiterate the limited
holding of Payne.2' Justice Scalia emphasized that the eighth
amendment requires the admission of victim impact evidence.
241
Justice Souter stated that although some of the arguments in Booth
were persuasive when taken individually, these arguments did not
justify the holding that the entire category of victim impact
evidence was unconstitutional.242
1. Concurring Opinion of Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that a proper
consideration was to look at the deceased victim as a unique
human being.243 Justice O'Connor argued that the Booth decision
236. Id at 2611.
237. Id See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 813 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing
the confusion in lower courts created by the holding in Booth); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,
395-96 (Rehnquist, CL., dissenting) (discussing the confusion of lower courts in applying Booth). See
also State v. Huertas, 51 Ohio St. 3d 22, 33, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1070 (1990) (Moyer, CJ., concurring)
(declaring that the fact that the majority and two dissenters in Huertas interpret the Booth and
Gathers decisions differently illustrates the confusion of the lower courts).
238. Payne, 111 . Ct. at2611.
239. Id 2611 (O'Connor, L, concurring); id 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring); id 2614 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
240. See infra notes 243-252 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion of Justice
O'Connor).
241. See infra notes 253-263 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion of Justice Scalia).
242. See infra notes 264-279 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion of Justice Souter).
243. Payne, 111 S. CL at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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was flawed because victim impact evidence is relevant and it
should be treated in the same manner as all other relevant
evidence.2 " Justice O'Connor asserted that the eighth amendment
does not command a different treatment of victim impact
evidence.24
5
Justice O'Connor further concluded that prosecutorial argument
of the impact of a crime on a victim is not barred by the eighth
amendment.246 Justice O'Connor pointed out that murder is the
ultimate act of depersonalization by taking away the life of a living
human being and "transforms a living person with hopes and
dreams into a cold corpse thereby taking away all that is special
and unique about a person. ' 247 Justice O'Connor concluded that
the fact that a prosecutor is giving some of the individuality and
life back to the victim is not barred by the Constitution.248
Justice O'Connor stated that the decision in Payne did not
mean that victim impact evidence must be admitted.249 Indeed,
according to Justice O'Connor, the Court held only that it is a
constitutionally valid procedure for a state to allow victim impact
evidence.5 0 Justice O'Connor also noted that the Court in Payne
did not decide the issue of whether the evidence of the family
members' characterizations and opinions about the crime violates
the eighth amendment.25' Justice O'Connor emphasized that the
Payne decision only dealt with the specific type of victim impact
evidence that demonstrated the victim's personal characteristics and
the emotional impact of the crime on the family of the victim.2 52
244. Id
245. Id
246. Id at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
247. Id (quoting Brief For All Political Committee as Amicus Curiae at 3, Payne, 111 S. Ct.
2597).
248. Id at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
249. Id
250. Id
251. Id
252. Id
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2. Concurring Opinion of Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion to express his conviction
that the eighth amendment not only allows the admission of victim
impact evidence, it requires such evidence to be admitted. 3
Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the Booth decision
created an injustice by allowing the defendant to bring forward any
mitigating evidence, while excluding any aggravating victim impact
evidence. 4 The Booth result, according to Justice Scalia, was not
demanded by the eighth amendment.25 On the contrary, Justice
Scalia concluded that the eighth amendment requires parity
between mitigating and aggravating evidence in the sentencing
phase2 6
The remainder, and largest portion, of Justice Scalia's opinion
focused on the stare decisis issue arising from the reversal of
Booth. 7 Justice Scalia stated that it is the Booth decision, and
not Payne, that defies reason. 8 Justice Scalia noted further that
stare decisis is based on a general principle that the settled
practices and expectations of society should not be disregarded by
the Supreme Court2 9 Justice Scalia asserted that it was the
Booth decision that was in violation of the general principal of
stare decisis and not the Payne decision.W Justice Scalia asserted
that the doctrine of stare decisis applies beyond the Supreme
Court's prior cases, extending to settled practices and expectations
of the public.26 1 Justice Scalia asserted that Booth violated stare
decisis because the holding that the actual harm caused in a crime
is irrelevant to punishment is against the expectations of
253. Id at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
254. Id
255. Id
256. Id
257. Id at 2613-14 (Scalia, I., concurring). See infra notes 394-428 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's new test for stare decisis).
258. Payne, I1I S. Ct. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
259. Id at 2613-14 (Scalia, J., concurring).
260. Id (Scalia, J., concurring).
261. Id at 2614 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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society." Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that Booth and
Gathers should be overruled.2 3
3. Concurring Opinion of Justice Souter
Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion to emphasize that
although victim impact evidence may be inflammatory, it is no
different than any other type of evidence.26" Justice Souter
disagreed with the Booth holding that victim impact evidence is
irrelevant to the determination of whether a defendant deserves the
death sentence.265 In arriving at this conclusion, Justice Souter
separated the reasoning of Booth into two elements; the prejudicial
effect of the victim impact evidence, and the requirement that the
jury consider the defendant as a unique human being.2t6 As to the
former element, Justice Souter argued that the Booth Court's
reasoning was meritorious but not sufficient to bar the entire
category of evidence.267 As to the latter element, Justice Souter
asserted that the Booth Court was mistaken.
268
Justice Souter agreed with the Booth Court that victim impact
evidence can be so inflammatory that the jury will not base its
decision on logic but rather on caprice or emotion.2 69 However,
Justice Souter argued that the potentially inflammatory nature of
victim impact evidence can be found in any form of evidence.270
Justice Souter noted that the Supreme Court and all other courts are
bound to search the record before them with painstaking care for
constitutional error.27 Therefore, Justice Souter concluded Booth
262. Id at 2613-14 (Scalia, J. concurring).
263. Id at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
264. Id at 2614 (Souter, L, concurring).
265. Id (Souter, J., concurring).
266. Id (Souter, J., concurring).
267. Id (Souter, J., concurring).
268. Id (Souter, J., concurring).
269. Id (Souter, J., concurring).
270. Id at 2614-15 (Souter, J., concurring).
271. Id at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring).
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went too far by making a blanket prohibition of victim impact
evidence.272
Justice Souter next asserted that the fact that a jury must
consider evidence of the defendant as a unique human being does
not bar other types of evidence."' Justice Souter argued that all
murderers, who have the capacity for criminal responsibility, know
that when they kill another unique human being there will be
people left behind who will have been injured.274 Justice Souter
stated that even if the defendant does not know the exact harm that
will be caused by the defendant's act, evidence of the actual impact
suffered to the victim should still be admissible.275
Justice Souter further supported the overruling of Booth by
arguing that the evidentiary standard of constitutional relevance set
forth in Booth was unconstitutional and unworkable. 276 Justice
Souter argued that if the Booth evidentiary standard were to be
taken seriously, there would be a need for a second jury to
determine the sentencing in a capital trial because the evidence
validly admitted during the trial would be constitutionally
inadmissible in the sentencing phase.277 Justice Souter argued that
the rule in Booth itself created an arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty by limiting the jury from considering relevant facts.278
272. Id (Souter, J., concurring).
273. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
274. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
275. Id. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring).
276. Id. Justice Souter argued that three facts illustrate why the standard is practically flawed.
I&. First, restricting relevant facts to those the defendant knew applies to all evidence and not simply
to victim impact evidence. Id. Second, details which the defendant did not know about will be
disclosed during the guilt phase of the trial. Id. Finally, the jury that determines guilt will usually
determine the imposition of capital punishment. Id.
277. Id. at 2617 (Souter, J., concurring).
278. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter posited a hypothetical where the defendant
learns of the presence of the victim's daughter through her shout prior to the murder. ICL Justice
Souter compared the above hypothetical to a situation in which the daughter watches the murder but
does not yell out. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). In the former case, the defendant knew that there was
a family member or friend that was witnessing the crime, and thus, under Booth, the evidence of the
impact of the crime on the daughter would be admissible. I&L (Souter, J., concurring). In the latter
situation, the defendant would not have known of the daughter's existence and thus her testimony
would not be admissible. Md. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter argued that resting a decision on
such a fortuity is arbitrary. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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Hence, Justice Souter concluded that Booth and Gathers should be
overruled.279
D. Dissenting Opinions of Justices Marshall and Stevens
1. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marshall
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice
Marshall declared that "[p]ower, not reason, is the new currency
of this Court's decision making."2 ' Although the majority of
Justice Marshall's opinion is devoted to the stare decisis issue, the
Justice did reiterate the arguments set forth in Booth and
Gathers.28 ' Justice Marshall noted that at the time of Booth the
core principle of the Supreme Court's capital sentencing
jurisprudence was that the defendant's death sentence must be
looked at as an individualized determination of the defendant's
personal responsibility and moral guilt.28 2 Justice Marshall argued
that this determination must be based on factors that limit the
jury's discretion, so as to minimize the chance of a death penalty
being handed down in an arbitrary or capricious manner.28 3
Justice Marshall stated that Payne, Booth and Gathers were
factually and legally indistinguishable and that the majority did not
assert any new discussion that justified the overruling of these
cases.
284
2. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Blackmun
In a separate dissent joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice
Stevens disagreed with the majority's premise that victim impact
evidence is relevant to the defendant's guilt or moral
279. Id (Souter, J., concurring).
280. Id at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
281. Id at 2620 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
282. Id at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
283. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
284. Id at 2620 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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culpability.285 Justice Stevens argued that even if Booth and
Gathers had not been decided, there is no precedent that would
allow such irrelevant evidence to be admitted in the sentencing
phase of a capital trial.286 Justice Stevens reasoned that the
admission of victim impact evidence would lead to the arbitrary
and capricious imposition of the death penalty in violation of the
eighth amendment.2
8 7
Moreover, Justice Stevens argued that the majority's decision
was based on its strong political appeal and not based on
constitutional logic. 288 Justice Stevens asserted that allowing the
defendant to admit relevant mitigating evidence does not justify the
admission of irrelevant victim impact evidence." 9 Justice Stevens
stated that the victim is not the one on trial, thus any evidence of
the victim's character is simply not an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance.29
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the premise that a criminal
prosecution requires an even-handed balance between the state and
the defendant.29' Justice Stevens pointed out that the Constitution
grants certain rights to the defendant, while imposing specific
limitations on the state to control the state's disproportionate
29power. 92 Justice Stevens emphasized that the Constitution
demands that the state prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.293
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority's inability to understand
this constitutional demand led the majority to misunderstand Justice
Powell's argument in Booth that the admission of victim impact
evidence risks shifting the focus of the sentencing hearing away
285. Id. at 2625 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
286. Id (Stevens, L, dissenting).
287. Id at 2631 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
288. Id at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
289. Id at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
290. Id at 2625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
291. Id at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
292. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
293. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also pointed to the fact that the rules of
evidence are weighted in the defendant's favor. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). For example, the state
cannot admit evidence of the defendant's character to prove a propensity to commit the crime, while
the defendant is free to introduce evidence of the defendant's law abiding nature. Id at 2627-28
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. EviD. 404(a)).
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from the defendant's responsibility for the crime, and turning the
inquiry into a mini-trial on the victim's character.294 Justice
Stevens declared that Booth did not consider this tactical risk a
problem, as the majority in Payne suggested.2 95 Rather, Justice
Souter noted that the Booth decision rested on the risk that the jury
will be so distracted by prejudicial and irrelevant considerations
that it will base its decision on whim or caprice.2 96
Justice Stevens concluded that, rather than giving the jury a
quick glimpse of the life of the victim that the defendant chose to
extinguish, as Chief Justice Rehnquist 97  and Justice
O'Connor298 asserted, Payne goes far beyond this by allowing a
jury to hold a defendant responsible for an array of harm that the
defendant could not have foreseen and for which the defendant is
not blameworthy.9 Due to this unforseen harm Justice Stevens
contended, that in some cases, the Payne rule will lead to the death
penalty being imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
300
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Payne v. Tennessee3"' overruled Booth v. Maryland" and
South Carolina v. Gathers3 ' by holding that the admission of
victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital case
does not violate the eighth amendment.3°4 The Supreme Court's
294. Id at 2629-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
295. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296. Id at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
297. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting)).
298. See id at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,397
(1988) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting)).
299. Id at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
300. Id at 2630-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
301. 111 . Ct. 2597 (1991).
302. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). See supra notes 85-117 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's opinion in Booth).
303. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's opinion in Gathers).
304. Payne, Il S. Ct. at 2609. See supra notes 124-300 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's opinion in Payne). It is important to note that the decision in Payne is limited by the fact
that the Court was not faced with a third category of victim impact evidence, declared
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decision in Payne has several ramifications at both the federal and
state level. In California, the impact of the Payne decision has
already been felt in the recent case of People v. Edwards°5
which settled the issue of the admissibility of victim impact
evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial.3°6 Further, the
Payne decision impacts the underlying theory of punishment the
Supreme Court uses in determining what evidence is relevant in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial.3 7 Finally, the Payne decision
may be charting a new course for the concept of stare decisis. °8
A. Ramifications of Payne on Capital Sentencing in California
The impact of Payne v. Tennessee on California law is
circumscribed by the Supreme Court's holding that the eighth
amendment neither prohibits nor requires the admission of victim
impact evidence by state courts. 9 The Court in Payne held only
that the admission of victim impact evidence is constitutional under
the eighth amendment.31° Hence, a state is free to determine
whether or not victim impact evidence or prosecutorial argument
of that evidence, will be allowed in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial. 1'
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Payne,
California's death penalty jurisprudence did not allow the
admission of victim impact evidence for two reasons 2.3 " First,
California courts were constrained by the Booth rule that the
unconstitutional in Booth, concerning a victim's family member's statements characterizing the crime,
the defendant, and the appropriate sentence. Id at 2614 n.1 (Souter, J., concurring).
305. 54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (1991).
306. See infra notes 309-338 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Payne on death
sentencing in California).
307. See infra notes 21-123 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's capital sentencing
philosophy).
308. See infra notes 394-427 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of the Payne
decision on the concept of stare decisis).
309. Payne, 111 S. CL at 2609.
310. See supra notes 124-299 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's opinion in Payne).
311. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
312. People v. Gordon, 50 Cal. 3d 1223, 1266-67,792 P.2d 251,277-78, 270 Cal. Rptr. 451,
476-78 (1990).
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admission of victim impact evidence was unconstitutional under the
eighth amendment.31 Second, the Supreme Court of California
had held in People v. Boyd 14 that under California Penal Code
section 190.3,315 only evidence that is within the statutory
definition of mitigating"' or aggravating"' factors may beadmitted in the sentencing phase of a capital trial.318
313. See i& (holding that the admission of victim impact evidence is unconstitutional under
Booth and Gathers). See supra notes 85-117 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's opinion
in Booth).
314. 38 Cal. 3d 762, 700 P.2d 782, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985).
315. Under Penal Code section 190.3 the following factors shall be taken into account by the
jury when determining the sentence in a capital case:
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted and any special
circumstances under Penal Code section 190.1.
C) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use
or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use violence.
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant
reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person.
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the affects of intoxication.
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(") Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation
in the commission of the offense was relatively minor.
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is
not a legal excuse for the crime.
CAt. PENAL CODE § 190.3(a)-(k) (West 1988).
316. Mitigating circumstances tend to reduce the degree of the defendant's "moral culpability."
See BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of mitigating circumstances).
317. Aggravating circumstances are those factors which tend to increase or amplify the crime's
gravity or injurious consequences. See BLACKs LAw DiCTnoNARY 65 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of
aggravating factor). Neither mitigating or aggravating factors are an element of the crime itself. IdL
at 60, 903. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988) (defining mitigating and aggravating factors
that are admissible in a capital trial).
318. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d at 773, 700 P.2d at 790, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 9. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.3 (West 1988) (describing procedure for determination as to penalty of death or life
imprisonment, including the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances). This analysis
is not applicable in non-capital cases. Id. In non-capital cases, California Penal Code section 190.3
does not apply, and Penal Code section 1191.2 allows victims or their representatives to make a
personal appearance at the sentencing phase of a trial and give a statement regarding the victim's
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However, after the Supreme Court's decision in Payne, the first
constraint was removed when Booth was overruled.
Consequently, in People v. Edwards,32 the California Supreme
Court was faced with the issue of whether to admit victim impact
evidence in a capital case.321 In Edwards, the defendant shot two
twelve-year-old girls just outside a campsite.3z2 One of the girls
died, and the other was injured. 323 The defendant, Edwards, was
sentenced to death for the crimes.324 At the sentencing phase of
Edward's trial, three photographs of the victims were admitted over
the defense's objection. 3' One photograph showed both girls
together at the campground the night before the shooting.32 The
other two photographs depicted the surviving victim some time
after the shooting.327
The defendant contended that the admission of the photographs
and prosecutorial argument on the impact of the crime on the
victims' families was irrelevant and inflammatory. 328 Edwards
asserted that regardless of the Supreme Court's decision in Payne,
the evidence was inadmissable in California because the
photographs and victim impact evidence did not come within any
of the statutorily-required aggravating or mitigating factors listed
views concerning the crime, the person responsible, and the need for restitution. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1191.1 (West Supp. 1992) (allowing the admission of victim evidence in the sentencing phase of
a criminal trial); id. § 190.3 (West 1988) (limiting admissible evidence in a capital trial to specified
aggravating and mitigating factors). Further, though the issue was not resolved in Booth, in a footnote
the Court in Booth intimates that in non-capital cases the considerations are different because of the
fact that death is a "punishment different from all other sanctions." Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.12.
However, the Booth Court expressly reserved the issue of the admissibility of victim impact evidence
in non-capital cases. Itt
319. See supra notes 124-300 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's opinion in Payne).
320. 54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (1991). Edwards was decided on
November 25, 1991. Il
321. lId at 832-33, 819 P.2d at 465, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
322. Id. at 804, 819 P.2d at 446, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706.
323. Id, at 805, 819 P.2d at 447, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 707.
324. Id. at 804, 819 P.2d at 445, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
325. Id. at 832, 819 P.2d at 464, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724.
326. Id
327. Id.
328. Id. at 832, 819 P.2d at 465, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
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under California Penal Code section 190.3.329 The prosecution
asserted that victim impact evidence was admissible under
subdivision (a) of section 190.3 which allows evidence that is a
"circumstance of the crime."330
The Court in Edwards declined to accept the defendant's
theory, and asserted that the word circumstances in section 190.3(a)
not only includes the immediate and temporal harm caused by the
defendant, but also encompasses that which "materially, morally,
or logically" surrounds the crime. 331  The Edwards Court
concluded that the specific harm caused by a defendant does
surround the crime materially, morally, or logically and hence is a
"circumstance" of the crime under subdivision (a) of California
Penal Code section 190.3.332 Moreover, the Court asserted that
the assumption of Gordon, that evidence of victim impact is not an
aggravating factor under 190.3, is suspect in light of later cases
333
329. Id. Edwards relied primarily on the case of People v. Gordon, 50 Cal. 3d 1223,792 P.2d
251, 270 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1990), in which the California Supreme Court held that the effect of the
crime on the victim's family or sympathy for the victim is, in most cases, not relevant to any material
circumstance under Penal Code 190.3(a). Gordon, 50 Cal. 3d at 1266-67,792 P.2d at 294,270 Cal.
Rptr. at 493. The court in Gordon stated that in light of Boyd, it was obvious that the effect of the
crime on the victim's family is inadmissible because the evidence did not fall under a mitigating or
aggravating factor under section 190.3. Id at 1266-67, 792 P.2d at 294, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 493. Under
the reasoning in Gordon, it appeared that victim impact evidence in a California capital case would
not be allowed even though Booth was overruled, because the barrier of Penal Code section 190.3
still remained. See supra note 15 (text of Penal Code section 190.3).
330. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 832, 819 P.2d at 465, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
331. Id at 832, 819 P.2d at 465, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
332. Id at 833, 819 P.2d at 465, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
333. The court in Edwards buttressed its holding by the fact that several California cases after
Gordon had held that argument and evidence based on the suffering the defendant had inflicted on
the victim was properly admitted as a circumstance of the crime under subdivision (a) of section
190.3. Id. In People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 802 P.2d 330, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1990), the court
upheld argument regarding the impact that other criminal conduct of the defendant had upon the
victims and expressly reserved the question as to whether Booth or Gathers would prohibit such
evidence. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d at 795-97, 802 P.2d at 353-54, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 852-54. See People
v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 536, 788 P.2d 640, 680, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 166 (1990) (holding that
the comment "What huge offense that is, and then on top of that, what does it do to the family? This
is a tragedy, not just for the person you killed, but the family and society .... - as admissible);
People v. Hasket, 30 Cal. 3d 841, 863-64, 180 640 P.2d 776, 790, 180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 654 (1982)
(a pre-Booth case holding that the prosecutor's comments suggesting that the jury -put themselves
in the shoes of Mrs. Rose [the attempted murder victim and the mother of the two murder victims]
and imagine suffering the acts inflicted on her" were admissible under 190.3 as a circumstance of
the crime).
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because the Gordon Court's holding was primarily based upon
Booth and Gathers.334
After Edwards, there is no doubt that victim impact evidence
is admissible in the sentencing phase of a capital trial in California,
and that victim impact evidence is a "circumstance" under
California Penal Code section 190.3(a). 315  The California
Supreme Court in Edwards affirmed the reasoning used by the
United States Supreme Court in Payne, that victim impact evidence
is relevant to the determination of whether a particular defendant
should receive the death penalty.336 As discussed below, the
Supreme Court's decision in Payne, permitting the use of victim
impact evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, has a
profound effect on the criminal law. 37 Both Payne and Edwards
signify a change in the fundamental theory of punishment that the
courts are employing in capital cases.338
B. Theories of Punishment
It is undisputed that victim impact is a harm caused by the
defendant's crime. The disputed question is whether that harm is
relevant to the jury's decision of whether to impose the death
penalty. The relevance of a particular type of evidence is
determined, in part, by the reason for which society seeks to
punish.339 Therefore, the justification for punishing the defendant
is, at least partly, determinative of whether victim impact evidence
is relevant in the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
334. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 834-35, 819 P.2d at 466-67, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726-27.
335. See ia at 835, 819 P.2d at 467, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727 (holding that victim impact
evidence is admissible in the penalty phase of a capital trial).
336. See infra notes 124-299 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's opinion in Payne).
337. See infra notes 301-338 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of the
Payne).
338. See infra notes 339-356 and accompanying text (discussing the two basic models of
punishment used in capital sentencing).
339. See generally Comment, The Significance of Vtctim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the
Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. C-r. L. REV. 1303, 1303-06 (1988)
[hereinafter Comment, The Significance ofVictim Harm] (discussing the Supreme Court's sentencing
philosophy and theories of punishment).
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The justification for punishment, in terms of both the reason for
and the extent of the punishment, falls into two general models:
retribution 340 or utilitarianism.3 41 It is beyond the scope of this
Note to fully discuss the theories and conflicts underlying either
model. However, a basic explanation of how the theories of
retribution and utilitarianism are generally used will aid in
developing a deeper understanding of the Supreme Court's decision
in Payne.
The basic premise of the retribution theory is that the actor
should be punished in proportion to what the actor deserves.342
The punishment must be scaled to moral responsibility, which in
turn can only be defined by the actor's ability to foresee the harm
the actor's conduct will cause.3 43 Since the theory of retribution
focuses in part on the choice the actor has made, if an actor cannot
foresee the harm the act will cause, the act is free from culpability
340. The term retribution has been used inconsistently by commentators. Many focus on the
concept of just desserts or moral culpability. See ANDREW VON HimsH, DoIN JUSTICE: THE CHOICE
op PUNISHMENTS chs. 8, 9 (1976) (discussing the theory of retribution as the concept that one should
be punished by what one deserves, which is commensurate with blameworthiness, which in turn is
based on the degree of culpability of the actor and the type of crime committed). See also Murphy,
Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHI. & PuB. AFFAIRS 217 (1973) (discussing the theory of retribution);
infra notes 342-349 (discussing the theory of retribution). Other commentators have used the term
retribution to be synonymous with retaliation or vengeance. See HONDEMCH, PUNISHMENT. THE
SuPPosED JusTImcATIoN 15-22 (1970) (asserting nine different meanings that can be ascribed to the
phrase "'the criminal deserves punislunent").
341. See Comment, The Significance of Victim Harm, supra note 339, at 1306-12 (defining
utilitarianism as the concept that society should act only if society gains from the act).
342. See Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601, 608-11 (1978)
[hereinafter Bedau] (discussing the moral basis of the retributive model); Comment, The Significance
of Victim Harm, supra note 339, at 1307 (discussing a theory of the moral basis for retribution).
According to Immanuel Kant, punishment must be based upon a moral principle which is focused
on the individual, and may never be imposed to benefit society at the expense of one of its citizens.
Id In Immanuel Kant's words: "'Judicial Punishment can never be administered merely as a means
for promoting another Good either with regard to the criminal himself or to Civil Society.... [Flor
one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another...
- KANT, THE PHiuosoaHY op LAW 195 (M. Kelley trans. 1887). A primitive form of retribution is
vengeance without respect to culpability. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis
on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. 1497, 1151-14 (1974) [hereinafter
Schulhofer] (discussing retaliation and vengeance). For the purposes of this Note, vengeance will be
considered a utilitarian theory and will not be considered a form of retribution due to its lack of
emphasis on moral blameworthiness.
. 343. See Schulhofer, supra note 342, at 1516 (discussing an actor's culpability, based upon the
actor's ability to foresee the risk of the actor's actions, as a factor in the calculus of defining moral
blameworthiness).
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and should not be punished.3' Likewise, if the actor can only
foresee one kind of harm, the actor cannot be morally culpable for
an unforeseeable harm that derives from the actor's decision to
engage in the morally culpable choice.345 Thus, retribution looks
to the actor's state of mind prior to when the act in question was
committed.346 Under the retributive model, the actual harm
caused by the defendant is irrelevant in the determination of the
deserved punishment. 7 Retribution, therefore, takes two forms,
a moral obligation to punish culpable conduct and a limitation on
punishment; the moral obligation not to punish non-culpable
conduct.348 Under the retributive model, only foreseeable victim
impact evidence is relevant to the sentencing phase of the capital
trial, while the actual victim impact, foreseeable or unforeseeable,
is irrelevant. 34
9
In contrast to the retributive theory, the basic premise of
utilitarianism is that an actor should be punished only if the
punishment furthers an interest of society.350 Examples of
mechanisms used to achieve utilitarian goals are deterrence,
rehabilitation, vengeance35' and incapacitation.352 The focus of
344. For example, imagine a person who is walking on a sidewalk and steps on a pressure
bomb perfectly hidden under the street. When the explosion of the bomb kills three people, the
person is not punished because the person is not culpable. Likewise, if the person was jaywalking,
which would be culpable conduct, when the person stepped on the bomb, the person's culpability
would not rise to the level of murder under the retribution model because the moral wrongness of
the decision to jaywalk was not based on the chance of killing someone by the blast from a bomb.
345. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597,2628 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting
that aspects of victim impact evidence unforeseeable to the defendant at the time of the defendant's
crime are irrelevant to a determination of the defendant's moral guilt).
346. Comment, The Significance of Victim Harm, supra note 339, at 1310; Rawls, Two
Concepts of Rules, 64 PIL. REv. 3, 5 (1955).
347. See Schulhofer, supra note 342, at 1508-17 (discussing why harm actually caused is an
inadequate basis for retributive punishment).
348. See Comment, The Significance of Victim Harm, supra note 339, at 1307 (discussing
Immanuel Kant's formulation of retribution as a limitation on punishing one man for the benefit of
others).
349. Xd at 1310.
350. Bentham, The Utilitarian Theory of Punishment, in NTODUCTON TO THE PRiNCIPLES OF
MoRALs AND LEGISLATION 162 (1823).
351. Some commentators argue that revenge is a primitive form of retribution without
consideration of moral blameworthiness. For purposes of this Note, revenge will not be considered
under the modem retributive model, because revenge does not focus on moral blameworthiness.
352. Comment, The Significance of Victim Harm, supra note 339, at 1310.
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utilitarianism is on the benefit gained by the punishment rather than
on punishing morally blameworthy conduct. 53 Admission of
victim impact evidence is relevant to the determination of
punishment under a utilitarian model in two respects. First,
admission of victim impact evidence may increase the defendant's
sentence which permits society as a whole, as well as the victim,
to express moral outrage. 54 Second, the admission of victim
impact evidence acts as a deterrent by punishing the defendant for
harm that the defendant did not intend.355 The Supreme Court's
decision in Payne, that victim impact evidence is admissible in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial, illustrates that the Court's
sentencing philosophy has changed from a pure retributive model
to include some aspects of utilitarianism.356
1. Recognizing Unintended Emotional Harm - A New Concept
of the Criminal Law
The Supreme Court has held that the death penalty is different
from all other forms of punishment.357 As a result, the Court has
held that the death sentence must be proportional to what the
defendant deserves.358  Hence, the Supreme Court's capital
353. See Bentham, The Utilitarian Theory of Punishment, in INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF MoRALs AND LEGISLATION 162 (1823) (stating that the purpose of law is to promote happiness);
Comment, The Significance of Victim Harm, supra note 339, at 1308 (discussing the utilitarian model
of punishment).
354. Comment, The Significance of Victim Harm, supra note 339, at 1304.
355. Id
356. Retribution and utilitarianism are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to consider both
the moral responsibility for an act, while at the same time considering the gain to society in
punishing the act.
357. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
358. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810 (1989) (stating that in death penalty
cases proportionality requires a nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant's moral
guilt). See also Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2702 (1991) (holding that a life sentence for
possession of cocaine was not cruel and unusual); Coker v. Georgia 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(holding unconstitutional a death sentence for the rape of an adult woman on the grounds that the
punishment was disproportional to the crime). The Court in Harmelin reasserted that the death
penalty is different than all other punishments and the requirement of proportionality is limited to
death penalty cases. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2611. See Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of
Punishment, 75 J. PHIL 601, 606-08 (discussing the requirement that punishment be in proportion
to what the defendant deserves).
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sentencing decisions have focused primarily on the defendant's
moral culpability, and therefore, on the retributive theory of
punishment. 359
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Booth v.
Maryland was based on the reasoning that only evidence pertaining
to the defendant's culpability is relevant to the determination of the
death penalty. 3 ° This holding in Booth is consistent with most,
but .not all,361 of the Supreme Court's capital punishment
jurisprudence. 362 The Booth Court's reliance on retribution was
illustrated by the Court's assertion that victim impact evidence,
which is evidence of harm caused by the defendant's crime,
generally does not reflect upon a defendant's moral culpability.363
However, the Court in Booth recognized that if the defendant was
aware of the impact on the victim through a circumstance of the
crime, victim impact evidence" would be relevant to the defendant's
moral culpability.3 4 Though consistent with the retributive
theory, an argument against the Booth Court's reasoning is that it
completely ignored a harm that is not only foreseeable, but is
highly likely to occur; the pain and suffering of the family of the
victim and the loss to society of one of its citizens.365 The Court
in Payne v. Tennessee took a different view of the harm caused by
the defendant. 366
The Payne Court based its conclusion, that victim impact
evidence is relevant during the sentencing phase, on the premise
that harm, both foreseeable and unforeseeable, has always been an
important concern of the criminal law in determining the elements
359. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,504-05 (1987). See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S.
805, 810 (1989) (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)) (asserting that the heart of the
retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of
the criminal offender); Comment, The Significance of VTictim Harm, supra note 339, at 1304
(discussing the Booth Court's use of retribution).
360. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05.
361. See Jurek v. Texas, 482 U.S. 262 (1976) (discussing the relevance of non-culpable
evidence contray to Booth's mandate of evidence that relates to the defendant's culpability).
362. Comment, The Significance of Victim Harm, supra note 339, at 1305.
363. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505, 504.
364. Id at 505.
365. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2615 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
366. See id at 2605 (holding that harm is relevant to the determination of the death sentence).
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of a crime and the appropriate punishment. 67 To illustrate this
argument, the Payne Court used Justice Scalia's example of a bank
robber who shoots a guard.3 If the guard dies, the robber is
charged with one crime, and if the guard lives the robber is
charged with another crime and sentenced differently. 6 9 This
rationale represents two fundamental changes in the Supreme
Court's sentencing philosophy.
First, the bank robber hypothetical does not provide a suitable
bench mark for the admission of victim impact evidence. Victim
impact evidence illustrates an emotional harm, while the distinction
in Justice Scalia's bank robbery hypotheticals turns upon physical
harm. In Justice Scalia's example of the bank robber, the defendant
is being punished differently based on an allegedly unintended
physical harm, the guard's death or mere injury. However, the
criminal law, until Payne, had not recognized unintended emotional
harm in the same way that it traditionally recognized unintended
physical harm.37 Therefore the Supreme Court is recognizing a
new form of unintended harm in the calculus of capital sentencing
punishment, unintended emotional harm.
The second fundamental change in criminal jurisprudence
resulting from the Court's holding in Payne is again illustrated by
Justice Scalia's bank robber hypothetical. The hypothetical
illustrates that in death penalty cases, the Supreme Court has
changed from a retributive model of punishment to a utilitarian
model. The bank robber in both instances has an identical amount
367. Il at 2609.
368. Id. at 2605.
369. id.
370. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct
in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L R. 1497, 1511 (1974). Virtually all crimes that have an element
of emotional harm require specific intent to cause the emotional harm. See, e.g., CA. PENAL CODE
§ 240 (West 1999) (definition of assault as the unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to
commit a violent injury on the person of another) (West 1988). A hypothetical will illustrate how
differently the criminal law treated unintended emotional harm from unintended, and possibly
unforeseeable, physical harm. If a bank robber shoots a bank customer in the arm, the bank robber
is charged with battery. If the victim is a surgeon who suffers a great deal of harm through
depression and sleepless nights due to the fact that the surgeon can never perform surgery again, the
defendant is charged with the same crime, a battery. The criminal law does not recognize emotional
harm as an element of a crime. Irrespective of the amount of unintended emotional harm the victim
suffers, the crime(s) that the defendant can be charged with are identical.
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of moral blameworthiness and yet is being punished
differently. 7' This change is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's earlier holdings that the jury in a capital case must focus
on a defendant's moral guilt.372 The Court, therefore, appears to
be deviating from the earlier holding that the death penalty is
fundamentally different from all other punishments, and due to this
difference requires focusing upon the defendant's moral guilt.3
This may be an indication that the Supreme Court's underlying
theory of punishment in capital cases is changing from retribution
to some form of utilitarianism.
2. The Valuation of Human Life - A Tort Concept
Another ramification of the Payne decision is that a potential
result of looking at the harm through victim impact evidence is the
valuation of human lives differently. In fact, a dissent in Payne
expressed concern that one implication of the majority's holding is
371. See Payne, 111 S. CL at 2605 (asserting that in Justice Scalia's hypothetical the defendants
would have the same level of moral blameworthiness).
372. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810 (1989) (stating that the defendant's
punishment must be tailored to the defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt); Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1987) (holding that only evidence relating to "...personal
responsibility and moral guilt..." is relevant to the capital sentencing decision) (quoting Edmond v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
373. See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810 (stating that the defendant's punishment must be tailored to
the defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt); Booth, 482 U.S. 496,502-03 (1987) (holding
that only evidence relating to "...personal responsibility and moral guilt" is relevant to the capital
sentencing decision) (quoting Edmond v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)). The change in focus
in Payne appears to be consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Walton v. Arizona,
110 S. Ct. 3074 (1990) (plurality opinion). In Walton the Supreme Court affirmed a death sentence
given under an Arizona statute which placed the burden on the defendant to show that mitigating
evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence. Id, at 3054-56. The effect of this statute was to create
a presumption that the defendant receive the death sentence. Id. This presumption seems to be
inconsistent with the Court's earlier holding in Woodson that the sentencer must focus on the
defendant as a unique individual. See Harris, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: a Retreat
from the "Death is Different" Doctrine, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 1389, 1395 (1991) (discussing Walton
v. Arizona and the Court's apparent change in sentencing philosophy from the construct that death
is different). But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 7202 (plurality opinion) (1991)
(asserting that death is different from all other forms of punishment).
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that different lives would be valued unequally by jurors. 74 For
example, a defendant convicted of killing a human being while
randomly firing a gun into a crowd might be sentenced differently
according to the identity or character of the victim. If the victim is
homeless and without a family, there will be little victim impact
evidence admitted in the sentencing phase. On the other hand, if
the victim is a well respected professional with a family, there will
undoubtedly be a large amount of victim impact evidence. Such
evidence may make the difference between the defendant receiving
life imprisonment or the death penalty.375 The net result is that
the same defendant, with the identical mens rea and moral
culpability, may be punished differently by the mere chance of
where the bullet landed. This hypothetical begs the question: what
is the value of a human life, and carl the loss of one life truly be
measured differently than the loss of another?376
Civil law frequently distinguishes between the relative "value"
of victims due to the fact that the damages awarded in tort law are
based on theories which require that defendants take plaintiffs as
they are.377 For example, in the shooting hypothetical above, the
defendant would likely be compelled to pay a large damage award
in one circumstance, while in the other, the defendant would pay
a relatively small judgment. This disparity is due in part to the tort
374. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the use of victim
impact evidence can only be to identify some victims that are more worthy of protection than others).
Justice Stevens also asserted that if the victim is a minority, the impact of the crime could be treated
differently by the jury depending upon the race of the victim. let
375. The mere fact that victim impact evidence is considered by the court as relevant,
necessarily suggests that in some instances, the admission of victim impact evidence alone will make
a difference. See FED. RuI.E Evm. 401 (definition of relevant evidence as any evidence that has a
tendency to establish the presence or absence, truth or falsity, of a fact).
376. One argument is that society is not punishing the two crimes differently based upon the
status of the victims. Instead, society is simply punishing the two crimes differently to reflect the total
amount of loss to society and to reflect the emotional harm caused to loved ones of the victim. In
other words, the focus is on the actual harm done to society. If one murder causes greater aggregate
pain and suffering than another, then, one murder has harmed society more and should receive greater
punishment.
377. See, e.g., Thompson v. Lupone, 135 Conn. 236, 62 A.2d 861, 863 (1948) (holding the
defendant liable for all recovery costs though the obesity of the 261 -pound plaintiff delayed recovery
from normal period of two weeks to eight months).
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law policy of compensating the victim and the victim's family for
the economic, physical and emotional losses suffered.378
However, the traditional focus of criminal law has not been one
of compensation, but one of punishment. 7 9 Therefore, one result
of Payne is the apparent introduction of a tort theory of
compensation into the Supreme Court's death sentence
jurisprudence, a strictly criminal area. The "compensation" is
derived by the victims through the concept of vengeance or
retaliation.8 0 In modem times this theory of punishment has been
widely rejected.38' This aspect of the Payne decision may be a
victory for victims' rights advocates since it recognizes a harm that
many have felt has gone unnoticed by the criminal law.382
C. Is Payne a Step in the Wrong Direction?
Another justification proffered by the Court in Payne for its
decision was that victim impact evidence should be admitted to
balance the scales of justice.3 3 The Payne Court rationalized that
since the defendant could bring in virtually any mitigating evidence
"without limitation as to relevancy," the prosection should be able
to balance this evidence with victim impact.3"4 This leads to the
378. See generally W. PAGE KEEMON Er AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TRE LAw OP TORTS
§§ 82-85 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the civil compensation system).
379. See generaly KADIsH & ScHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND rrs PRocEss 113-14 (5th ed.
1989) (discussing the purposes for punishment). See also CAL PENAL CODE § 1170(a) (West Supp.
1992) (declaring that the legislature finds that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment).
380. See Schulhofer, supra note 342, at 1511 (discussing retaliation as a form of satisfying the
desires of victims and the public's want for vengeance). Some commentators argue that retaliation
is necessary to prevent private citizens from taking the law into their own hands. Id.
381. Id. at 1500-01. Most commentators, judges, and legislatures have denounced vengeance
as an unacceptable policy. IR. See H. L A. HART, PuNIsHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 130-31 (1968)
(discussing the disapproval of retaliation and vengeance); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 37 (M.
Howe ed. 1963) (discussing the disapproval of retaliation and vengeance).
382. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (discussing the victims' rights movement and
the goals of victims' rights activists).
383. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. CL at 2608-09. See also supra notes 124-300 and
accompanying text (discussing the underlying rationale for the Payne decision).
384. Payne, I11 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting the Supreme Court of Tennessee in State v. Payne, 791
S.W.2d 10, 19 (1990). See U at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that sentencing without victim
impact evidence would be an unbalanced process); Payne, 111 S. CL at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that the majority correctly observes the injustice of admitting mitigation evidence while
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threshold question: Why is irrelevant evidence allowed to be
admitted on behalf of the defendant?
The Supreme Court has held that in death penalty cases the
defendant must be looked upon as a unique human being because
of the severity and finality of the'punishment of death.385 Under
this standard there appears to be no limitation as to what evidence
qualifies as shedding light on the uniqueness of the defendant.386
It has been suggested that this standard simply goes too far.3 7
One of the main purposes of the sentencing phase is to determine
the appropriate penalty.388  The only relevant information
regarding sentencing is evidence that will somehow aggravate or
mitigate the guilty defendant's responsibility for the charged
crime.
89
The facts of Payne illustrate how potentially irrelevant
information may be admitted on a defendant's behalf. In Payne the
defendant offered evidence that he was a good son, that he did not
use drugs, that he "vas a polite prisoner and that he was good to
excluding aggravating evidence). See also supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text (discussing
the Payne majority's balance of justice rationale for the admission of victim impact evidence).
385. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976). The Supreme Court has held
that a state may not preclude the sentencer from considering any relevant mitigating evidence and
that the sentencer must look at the defendant as a unique human being. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982).
386. See Woodson, 428 U.S. 280,303 (1976) (holding that the jury must consider the defendant
as a unique human being). Virtually any fact that has to do with the defendant's life can have some
relevance to the defendant's uniqueness because a person's uniqueness is the summation of the
person's environment and genetic structure. However, it seems that a more appropriate inquiry would
consider what evidence is relevant to the decision of whether a particular defendant should receive
the death sentence.
387. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the requirement of the
admission of relevant mitigating evidence is wrong, and when combined with the remainder of the
Supreme Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence, is unworkable).
388. See, e.g., CAL PENAL CODE § 190.1(c) (West 1988) (requiring that once a defendant is
found guilty of first degree murder, further proceedings are to be held to determine the appropriate
sentence).
389. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,504-07 (1987) (asserting that only evidence relevant
to the defendant's moral blameworthiness is relevant during the sentencing phase of a capital trial).
The Payne decision did not overrule the premise in the Booth decision that only evidence relevant
to moral blameworthiness is relevant. Payne merely asserted that victim impact evidence is relevant
to the moral blameworthiness of the defendant. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609. See also CAL PENAL
CODE 190.3 (West Supp. 1991) (limiting evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial to
mitigating or aggravating).
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children. Questions may be raised as to how this information
reflects on Payne's responsibility and culpability for the murders
of Charisse and Lacie Christopher. In fact, the Court in Payne
stated that these facts were not related to the circumstances of the
crime.391  The fact that Payne was a polite prisoner does not
appear to mitigate his moral responsibility for the murders he
committed. Arguably, the only purpose being served by this
information is to incite sympathy in the jury and lead them to an
arbitrary or capricious determination. The admission of this sort of
irrelevant evidence is at odds with the notion that society and the
defendant are equally entitled to justice and due process.392
After Payne it is evident that the standard for admitting
mitigating evidence on the behalf of the defendant should be re-
evaluated to promote justice to both the accused and the accuser.
The scope of mitigating evidence admitted on the defendant's
behalf must be limited to some factual relevance to the culpability
of the defendant for the crime that he has committed.393 Thus, the
justification for introducing arguably irrelevant victim impact
information, based upon the fact that the defendant is allowed to
admit irrelevant mitigating evidence, may be a step in the wrong
direction. The Payne decision may be creating an environment
where the sentencing of capital defendants can be motivated by
390. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2602-03.
391. See id. at 2609 (stating that none of the information offered by the defendant was related
to his crime).
392. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon 418 U.S. 683,709 (1974) (holding that the very integrity
of the judicial system depended upon full access to evidence by either side): Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 196-97 (1953) (overruled on other grounds in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 381 (1968)
(reiterating that the People of the State are entitled to due process); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
288-89 (1947) (in holding that a defendant is entitled to a neutral jury as opposed to a friendly jury,
the Court expressly stated society has a right to a fair trial). As Justice Cardozo stated for the Court:
"'But justice, though due the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not
be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
393. For example, it is a well known fact that a high proportion of sexual offenders have been
abused themselves. Therefore, evidence showing that a defendant had been sexually abused would
be relevant to show that the defendant was somehow less responsible for a rape and murder the
defendant committed. This evidence would arguably show that the defendant had less free will or
understanding of the acts than a like defendant who was not sexually abused.
1441
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
emotion or caprice. In the final analysis, such an environment
cannot be relied on to promote justice for the defendant or society.
D. Stare Decisis: A New Test?
The doctrine of stare decisis is a fundamental principal of the
common law.394 Stare decisis requires that where a court has
settled a point of law on a particular set of facts, the court will
apply that principal to facts of a substantially similar nature.395
Stare decisis is an important concept "because it promotes
evenhanded, predictable and consistent development of legal
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions and contributes to
the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process."396 The
Supreme Court has stated that the concept of stare decisis has
diminished force in constitutional cases where no legislative change
is available to correct the law.397 However, the Supreme Court
has held that even in constitutional cases, the doctrine still has
some force, and that a departure from precedent must be supported
by some "special justification. 398
The concept of judicial review of the constitution by the High
Court places the Supreme Court beyond any practical means of the
people to assert their dissatisfaction with the Court's decisions
through the legislative process.3 9 Therefore, for the concept of
judicial review of the constitution by the Supreme Court to be
394. See generally Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SUP. Cr. REv.
211, 215-219 (1963) [hereinafter Israel] (discussing the Supreme Court's use of stare decisis).
395. BLACK'S LAw DIcr. 4th ed., 1577 (1968).
396. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
397. IL at 2610; Israel, supra note 394, at 216-17. See Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285
U.S. 393, 410 n.5 (1932) (noting that there have been only two occasions that the constitution has
been amended to nullify a decision of the Court). But see Boudin, The Problem of Stare Decisis in
Our Constitutional Theory, 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. 589, 601-02 (1931) (stating that stare decisis should not
be given any consideration in constitutional decisions).
398. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984); Payne 111 S. Ct. at 2613 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Id at 2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
399. See Israel, supra note 394, at 216 (discussing the inability of the legislature to change
constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court). See also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas., 285 U.S.
393, 410 n.5 (1932) (noting that on only two occasions has the constitution been amended to nullify
a decision of the Court).
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accepted in a democracy that is built upon the foundation that the
people have a voice in determining what is the law and policy of
the nation, it is especially important that judicial review be
consistent and based upon more than the makeup of the Court at
any point in time.4° Otherwise, the Court could not maintain its
role as the interpreter of the constitution, a document that
symbolizes continuity.'
Stare decisis, however, is not an "inexorable command" that
must always be followed.' ° Traditionally, four justifications have
been used by the Supreme Court to justify overruling prior
constitutional decisions." First, changing circumstances over the
passage of time have required that the prior case be overruled.o 4
Second, the lesson of experience has shown either the erroneous
nature of the factual assumption upon which the decision was
based, or the administrative difficulties and uneven application the
case has brought to the area of law." The third, and the most
frequently used justification is that later precedent has shown that
the earlier opinion was wrong.' Under this rationale, the Court
shows that a subsequent line of cases is inconsistent with the
400. See Israel, supra note 394, at 214-15 (discussing the importance of promoting an
acceptable image of the Court through the doctrine of stare decisis).
401. Id at 217. See Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLuM. L REV. 734, 736 (1949) (discussing
the symbolism of the Constitution). Justice Jackson once asserted that if the continuity of the
Supreme Court's decisions is disrupted, it will give the appearance that precedent in the Supreme
Court has -*a mortality rate almost as high as authors [of the decision]" Id. (quoting Jackson, The
Task of Maintaining Our Liberties: The Role of The Judiciary, 39 A.B.A. J. 961,962 (1953)); Israel,
supra note 394, at 214-15 (discussing the Supreme Court's use of stare decisis).
402. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
403. Israel, supra note 294, at 219-29 (discussing the Supreme Court's techniques of overruling
prior decisions).
404. Id at 219. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (stating that
subsequent changes or development of the law are sufficient justifications for overruling a previous
decision); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-95 (1954) (citing the change in the status
of public schools since the overruled case, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), was decided);
The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443 (1851) (using this technique in one of the Supreme Court's earliest
overruling cases).
405. Israel, supra note 394, at 221-23. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
412 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that the lesson of experience is a sufficient justification to
overrule a prior decision).
406. Israel, supra note 394, at 223. See Paterson, 491 U.S. at 173 (stating that a particular
precedent has become detrimental to consistency in the law).
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original decision to be overruled.' Finally, the fourth category
consists of several factors that help buttress the three rationales
stated above, but on their own do not justify overruling a case.4 8
These factors include: (1) The previous decision was decided by a
divided Court; (2) the original context did not allow the Court to
give the issue the deliberate consideration that it deserved; (3) the
unavailability of a lesser ground that would permit the Court to
reach the correct result.'
The majority in Payne reiterated some, but not all, of the
traditional purposes and factors underlying the concept of stare
decisis.4 ° However, there appear to be several significant
changes in the majority's formulation and analysis of the
application of stare decisis. Similar to traditional analysis, the
majority's discussion of stare decisis asserted that the doctrine is
most important in cases involving property and contract rights.411
However, unlike traditional analysis, the Rehnquist majority
asserted that the opposite is true in cases involving procedural and
evidentiary rules.4 " Further, in applying the doctrine of stare
decisis to Payne the Court gave great weight to the fact that the
case was a narrowly decided, five-to-four decision that was settled
over spirited dissents.413 Finally, the Court gives weight to the
fact Booth was questioned by members of the Court in subsequent
cases.
414
As Justice Marshall asserted, taken at face value, this
formulation of stare decisis gives broad latitude to the Court to
overrule precedent cases in the areas of procedure, evidence, and
constitutional law, including cases involving civil liberties and the
407. Israel, supra note 394, at 223. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961) (pointing
to the basic inconsistency between the Court's refusal to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence
and the required exclusion of all coerced confessions, irrespective of their reliability).
4.08. Israel, supra note 394, at 227-28. The purpose of these factors is to lessen the precedential
value of the prior decision. Id
409. Israel, supra note 394, at 226-27.
410. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2610-11.
411. Jd. at 2610.
412. Id
413. Id. at 2611.
414. Id.
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bill of rights. 41 5 A complete discussion of all the cases that this
new test could affect is beyond the scope of this Note. However,
a brief analysis of two cases is illustrative of the potential impact
of Justice Rehnquist's formulation of the doctrine of stare decisis.
In the areas of both "procedure" and "evidence" a significant
case that fits the Payne criterion for overruling a case is Miranda
v. Arizona.416 In Miranda the Court held, in a five-to-four
4 17
decision, that for a custodial statement made during interrogation
to be valid against a defendant at trial, the defendant must be
warned of the defendant's right to remain silent, warned that
anything said could be used against the defendant in a court of law,
and that the defendant has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed."' The Miranda decision has been
questioned by members of the Court and has been limited by
415. Id at 2623 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Based on this new test, the following five-to-four
split cases are open to be overruled: Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. CL 2729, 2736
(1990) (recognizing a first amendment right not to be denied public employment on the basis of party
affiliation); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Coim'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990)
(recognizing a first amendment right to advertise legal specialization); Zinermon v. Bureh, 494 U.S.
113 (1990) (due process right to procedural safeguards aimed at assuring voluntariness of decision
to commit oneself to mental hospital); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990) (finding a fourth
amendment right to exclusion of illegally obtained evidence introduced for impeachment of defense
witness); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987) (finding a first amendment right of a
public employee to express views on matter of public importance); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,
62 (1987) (finding the existence of a fifth amendment and sixth amendment right of a criminal
defendant to provide hypnotically refreshed testimony on his own behalf); Gray v. Mississippi, 481
U.S. 648,668 (1987) (rejecting applicability of harmless error analysis to the eighth amendment right
not to be sentenced to death by "death qualified" jury); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,180 (1985)
(recognizing that the sixth amendment right to counsel is violated by introduction of statements made
to a government informant-codefendant in the course of preparing defense strategy); Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 531-31 (1985) (rejecting the theory that the
tenth amendment immunizes states from federal regulation); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42
(1984) (finding a right to obtain injunctive relief from constitutional violations committed by judicial
officials). See Payne 111 S. Ct. 2623 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing the above cases).
416. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Arguably, Miranda could be overruled under traditional stare decisis
doctrine. However, the Payne stare decisis analysis, as illustrated by the following analysis, gives
the Court even more latitude in which to overrule Miranda. If the Court chooses to overrule Miranda
it is highly unlikely that the Court would rely on Payne exclusively, but this would be an opportunity
to further indoctrinate the new stare decisis test from Payne.
417. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Warren. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439-99.
Concurring Justices were Black, Douglas, Brennan and Fortas. Id Justice Clark dissented, but
concurred in the result Justice Harlan dissented and was joined by Justices White and Stewart. Id
at 499-526, 526-45. Justice White also wrote a separate dissent. Id at 526.
418. Id, at 444.
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subsequent cases.419 In fact, many commentators argue that
Miranda's constitutional underpinnings have been stripped from
beneath the decision.42 Considering these facts, the Miranda
decision may well have been a consideration of the Rehnquist
Court in defining the Court's new formulation of stare decisis.42'
Whether or not the Court decides to overrule Miranda remains to
be seen, but after Payne, it seems that stare decisis would no
longer be a barrier.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority422 is a
another example of a case which may be impacted by the Payne
formulation of stare decisis. In Garcia, a five-to-four majority
overruled the previous five-to-four majority decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery4' which itself had overruled the six-to-
two decision of Maryland v. Wfitz.424 Garcia abandoned the test
of National League of Cities which held that a state or municipal
government activity was not subject to regulation by Congress
under the commerce clause when the activity was a "traditional
419. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1974) (finding that a failure to give
Miranda warnings did not violate the fifth amendment but only the "prophylactic standards"
developed to protect that right, while Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, held that the warnings were
constitutionally required); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1970) (allowing a statement
made without proper warnings to be used to impeach the defendant's testimony despite clear
language in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, to the contrary). See also Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle
in the Supreme Court, 1986 DuiE LJ. 1, 32-39 [hereinafter Bradley] (discussing the erosion of the
Miranda decision).
420. See Herman, The Supreme Court; the Attorney Genera4 and the Good Old Days of Police
Interrogation, 48 OHIo ST. LAW J. 733, 738 [hereinafter Herman] (stating that, at one point, six
Justices of the Court believed that Miranda was not necessary); Bradley, supra note 419, at 37-38
(stating that the Tucker decision held that Miranda was not a constitutional holding). See also Oregon
v. Elstad 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (holding that it was an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold
that a "simple failure" to apply Miranda warnings does not justify exclusion of subsequent fruit);
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 449-52 (holding that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to
evidence that was a result of a Miranda violation). Cf New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 674
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court's power to exclude evidence must be
constitutionally based or Miranda and its progeny are an unconstitutional exercise ofjudicial power).
421. Some commentators have argued that the decision in Tucker, written by Justice Rehnquist,
laid the groundwork for overruling Miranda. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977
Sup. CT. REV. 99, 123. See Bradley, supra note 419, at 37-38 (discussing the erosion of the Miranda
decision).
422. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
423. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
424. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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governmental function."'" Garcia appears to be a classic
illustration of a case that fits within the framework of the Payne
majority's new test. National League of Cities was a closely
divided five-to-four constitutional decision426 that was recently
decided and has been questioned by members of the court. In fact,
both Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor have called for the
overruling of Garcia at the first opportunity.42 7 The Payne stare
decisis test provides strong ammunition with which to overrule
Garcia.
Miranda and Garcia are just two illustrations of the potential
repercussions of the Payne majority's formulation of stare decisis.
It is impossible to predict what cases will be overturned under this
new formulation, but it is certain that if the Supreme Court does
apply the Payne test literally, the Court's precedents in the areas of
constitutional law, procedure and evidence that were decided by a
five-to-four majority, are on tenuous ground. However, if the life
span of Booth and Gathers are any indication of what is in store,
the future looks very different.4 28
CONCLUSION
The Payne holding represents a victory for the victims' rights
movement. The admission of victim impact evidence in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial represents a new focus in capital
sentencing jurisprudence. In admitting victim impact evidence, the
Payne decision has changed the emphasis of the sentencing phase
from the moral blameworthiness of the defendant to society's
desire for vengeance and retaliation. It can be argued that Payne
425. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530-31,548. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 (asserting
the traditional government function test).
426. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856, 880. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of
the Court in which Justices Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell Joined. Justice Blackmun filed
a separate concurring opinion. Il at 856. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
White and Marshall joined. Ia. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent. Id National League of Cities,
426 U.S. at 553. Dissenting Justices were Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Id.
427. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); kL at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
428. See Payne at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that an -extensive upheaval" of
the Supreme Court's precedent may be in store).
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recognizes the idea that the defendant has harmed the victims of
crime, as well as society, and so should be held accountable for
this harm. However, it must be noted that Payne has also
recognized a new factor in the death sentence calculus, unintended
emotional harm. Additionally, in overturning the five-to-four
decisions of Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers, the
Supreme Court appears to be charting a new course in the doctrine
of stare decisis. The Payne Court's formulation of stare decisis
may indicate a significant change in the constitutional, procedural
and evidentiary jurisprudence over the years to come.
Christopher W. Ewing
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